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I. INTRODUCTION
Any evaluation of the judicial application of statutes must
consider both substantive results and value judgments about the
proper relationship between courts and legislatures. The first
part of this Article will attempt to demonstrate that American
jurisprudence contains respectable authority to justify either an
expansive or a restricted judicial role in the creation of policy
through the application of statutes. A subsidiary theme of this
Article is that the beauty of judicial creativity must be examined
together with its dangers and inadequacies.
To further evaluate the wisdom of judicial creativity in ap-
plying statutes, however, one must consider more than substan-
tive results and the general relationship between courts and leg-
islatures. While neither of those subjects is unimportant, the
institutional considerations present only in particular categories
of cases also deserve attention. This Article examines that cate-
gory of cases in which courts, by exercising their creative role in
interpreting statutes, grant substantial power to administrative
agencies. The primary example is the United States Supreme
Court's grant of power to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.' Although a
thorough analysis of cable television regulation is beyond the
scope of this Article, the material presented here does suggest
that more attention should be given' to the inadequacies of the
legislative process, or at least to the reasons why Congress has
not yet made any comprehensive policy concerning cable televi-
sion regulation.2
1. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
2. This Article only asks the question. At first blush, it is fair to ask whether some-
thing is wrong with the legislative process when a substantial industry is regulated on
the basis of judicially granted, rather than legislatively granted, authority. See infra part
II for the discussion of Southwestern Cable Co. After reviewing the history of cable tele-
vision, however, one could conclude that lack of congressional guidance served a useful
function, although that is only one possible conclusion. In any event, this Article suggests
that where the main reason for judicial creativity is legislative inaction, merely accepting
the need for such judicially created policy is not the appropriate response. Instead, the
more appropriate response may be to analyze and improve the legislative process. See J.
HURsT, DEALING Wrm STATUTES 1-2 (1982). Perhaps one of the reasons the legal commu-
nity fails to pay more attention to the legislative process is that "[j]udge-made law is still
the darling of the legal philosophers." Id. at 1. Congress may at long last be about to
enact legislation addressing the regulation of cable television. See infra note 521.
[Vol. 35
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II. JUDICIAL CREATIVITY IN STATUTORY AREAS
Judicial creativity in the development of law stands as an
accepted fact in the framework of judicial decisionmaking3 Nev-
ertheless, when courts deal with statutes, the prevailing concept
of legislative supremacy4 substantially circumscribes that crea-
tivity.5 This section will examine a court's proper creative role,
or lack thereof, in dealing with admittedly constitutional stat-
utes. The discussion demonstrates that our jurisprudence con-
tains a wide spectrum of views on the extent to which courts
should exercise a creative policymaking role in the administra-
tion of statutes. Thus, courts may find respectable authority to
justify either a creative or a restricted role in statutory
application.
A. From Statutory Analogy to Judicial Supremacy
In 1908, Roscoe Pound predicted that courts would eventu-
ally use statutes just as they use principles of judge-made law;
courts would reason from statutes and extend them as new situ-
ations arose by first applying them as authority equal to cases,
and later as authority superior to judge-made law.6 He noted
3. Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation 38 S. CAL. L.
RaV. 1, 1 (1965).
4. See R. DiKsON, TH INTE RPrATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-9 (1975).
Senator Jack Davies, for example, notes that judge-made law may be either judicially or
legislatively changed. Placing only judicially enunciated constitutional law doctrines
higher than statutes, Davies states: "Higher still in the order of legal primacy are rules
derived from legislative enactment, for they can be changed only by the legislature."
Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT.
L. REv. 203, 203 (1979)(footnote omitted). Courts have considerable flexibility in inter-
preting the federal and state constitutions. See, e.g., E. Lxvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL
REASONING 58-59 (First Phoenix ed. 1961). Although courts frequently exercise judicial
creativity in declaring statutes unconstitutional, the constitutionality of statutes is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
5. See, e.g., E. BiSHiN, supra note 3, at 2; Levi, supra note 4, at 28-30; Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in "the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (1975); Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 H~Av. L. REv. 863, 878 (1930)("ITlhe necessity of considering precise
words points to an important difference when a statute is to be applied, and imposes
certain' limitations in the application."). Nevertheless, courts still exercise substantial
creativity in applying statutes. See, e.g., R. DICKERsON, supra note 4, at 23-24; Bishin,
supra note 3, at 3.
6. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAxv. L. Rxv. 383, 385-86 (1908).
1984]
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that the "orthodox common law attitude" led the courts to give
statutes a "strict and narrow interpretation."7 He also observed
that while courts tended to construe statutes liberally, the same
courts did not reason from statutes to decide cases not directly
governed by a statute's terms.8 Over fifty years later, Pound
again stated that the judicial attitude that gives effect directly to
statutes while refusing to reason by analogy from them "repre-
sents more nearly the attitude toward which the course of deci-
sion has been tending in the present century."9 Pound asserted
that "when the growing point of a legal system shifts definitely
to legislation, the legal system must come at least" to reason by
analogy from statutes.1"
Panama Railroad v. Rock"" illustrates how a court might
use a statute as a principle in lawmaking. In Panama Railroad,
the Supreme Court held that no right of action for wrongful
death existed in the Canal Zone. The Court began its analysis
with the settled principle that the common law did not afford a
private remedy for wrongful death.1 2 The Court then reversed a
7. Id. at 385.
8. Id. According to Pound, courts may approach "legislative innovations," or stat-
utes, in four different ways:
(1) They might receive it fully into the body of the law as affording not only a
rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and hold it, as a later
and more direct expression of the general will, of superior authority to judge-
made rules on the same general subject; and so reason from it by analogy in
preference to them. (2) They might receive it fully into the body of the law to
be reasoned from by analogy the same as any other rule of law, regarding it,
however, as of equal or co-ordinate authority in this respect with judge-made
rules upon the same general subject. (3) They might refuse to receive it fully
into the body of the law and give effect to it directly only; refusing to reason
from it by analogy but giving it, nevertheless, a liberal interpretation to cover
the whole field it was intended to cover. (4) They might not only refuse to
reason from it by analogy and apply it directly only, but also give to it a strict
and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases which it cov-
ers expressly.
Id. The fourth approach, he said, represented the "orthodox common law attitude" and
the third, "the attitude toward which we are tending." Pound then "submitted that the
course of legal development upon which we have entered already must lead us to adopt
the method of the second and eventually the method of the first ... ." Id. at 386.
9. III R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 658 (1959).
10. Id. at 659 (footnote omitted). For a recent, extensive treatment of statutory
analogy, see Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common Law
Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554 (1982).
11. 266 U.S. 209 (1924).
12. Id. at 211.
4
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judgment for the plaintiff because no applicable statutory provi-
sion provided specifically for wrongful death liability.13 The
Court reasoned that where liability has been premised on a stat-
ute in a common-law system, a court cannot extend liability to a
situation not specifically covered by a statute. Justice Holmes,
dissenting for himself, Chief Justice Taft, and Justices McKenna
and Brandeis, expressed an opinion consistent with Pound's
view that statutes could be used by analogy. 4 According to
Holmes' view, evidence that most common-law jurisdictions al-
low recovery for wrongful death by statute did not mean that a
statute was necessary for recovery; rather, such evidence sug-
gested that a policy in favor of recovery had replaced a policy
against recovery.' 5 Holmes stated:
[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes
have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when in
terms covering only particular cases may imply a policy differ-
ent from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude a
reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their
scope .... 11
Thus, the difference between the traditional common law, in
which courts draw a sharp distinction between common-law and
statutory principles, and what Pound considered the more ad-
vanced view of statutes used as principles, may lead to different
results.17
Not only does the common law's sharp distinction between
cases and statutes discourage use of statutes as persuasive au-
thority for common-law development, this distinction also tends
to discourage further common-law development in areas sub-
stantially covered by statutes. For example, early in this century
the New York Court of Appeals declined to recognize a right of
privacy as a basis for a common-law cause of action.'" The case
13. Id. at 215.
14. Id. at 216 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Id. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).
16. 266 U.S. at 216 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the United States
Supreme Court held that other wrongful death statutes could be used as persuasive au-
thority for recovery even though no statute provided specifically for such recovery in the
particular circumstances of the case. Id. at 389-93. See infra notes 56-59 and accompany-
ing text.
18. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Inter-
1984]
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involved the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's picture for ad-
vertising purposes. 19 In the following year, apparently in re-
sponse to that decision,2 0 the New York legislature created a
statutory right of privacy limited to the unauthorized use of an
individual's name or picture for trade or advertising.21
A court faced with a right-of-privacy case could view such a
statute in one of two ways. First, the court could adopt the view
that fully receives statutes into the law and reasons from them.
Under this view, the court could interpret the statute as an ex-
pression of legislative dissatisfaction with the court's failure to
recognize a common-law right of privacy and extend recovery in
deserving situations not covered by the statute. Second, the
court could adopt the view that marks a sharp distinction be-
tween the common law and statutes. Under this view, a court
could interpret the statute as indicating that the right involved
has become the province of the legislature and exists only to the
extent that the statute creats it. The New York Court of Ap-
peals adopted the latter view and noted that "the right of pri-
vacy . . . rests solely in and is limited by statute. 2 2 Although
other courts have recognized the right absent statutory enact-
estingly, one of the concurring judges later defended this decision in a law review article.
O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437 (1902).
19. See 171 N.Y. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442.
20. See Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196
N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (1959); P. MISHKIN AND C. MORRIS, ON LAw IN COURTS 318 (1965);
Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 693, 695 (1912); Nizer, The Right of
Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REv. 526, 538 (1941).
21. 1903 N.Y. LAWS, Chapter 132; now N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney
1948).
22. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 854, 196 N.Y.S.2d
975, 977 (1959). Accord, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 497 n.2, 382
N.E.2d 1145, 1146 n.2, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 n.2 (1978). Nizer, referring to the New
York statute, stated that "[i]t has been difficult to overcome the inference that other
invasions of privacy were not intended to be made actionable." Nizer, supra note 20, at
538. After reviewing privacy law developments in other states, he concluded:
Wherever the right of privacy has been legislated into existence its devel-
opment has been restricted by the rigidity of the statute. In those states which
have worked the right of privacy into the fabric of their common law, however,
it has grown and altered to fit the changing conditions of modem times.
Id. at 539. Recently, a panel of the Appellate Division in New York stated that "[s]ince
the right of privacy in this State is statutory it is more restricted than that right in
States where it is recognized without legislation." Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58
A.D.2d 45, 47, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1977), af'd, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403
'N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978).
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ment,2 s the New York Court of Appeals still refuses to recognize
a common-law right of privacy.
24
In the right-of-privacy example, a court could reason from
the statute and arguably act to implement legislative policy. In
the wrongful death example, in which a court could examine
statutes of other jurisdictions for policy guidance, a court would
still be making policy, but it would be giving weight to another
state's legislative policy just as it might give weight to another
state's court-made policy. Viewed in this light, the concept of
reasoning from statutes by analogy gives substantial weight to
legislative policy.
2 5
In his early discussion of using statutes by analogy, Pound
seemed to advocate legislative supremacy in policymaking. He
criticized judicial disregard for legislative policy through the
23. E.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969); Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Housh v. Peth,
165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.Md 340 (1956).
24. Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218
(1978). However, the New York courts have exercised some judicial creativity in the pri-
vacy area. A New York trial court, for example, recently held that a plaintiff could re-
cover damages for a privacy-right violation involving publication of disclosures made to a
psychiatrist during a lengthy psychoanalysis. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). The court conceded that New York recognizes no common-law
right of privacy, but rested its decision on (1) statutory and regulatory public policy
barring a physician from disclosing a patient's confidences, and (2) an implied promise of
confidentiality. 93 Misc.2d at 212, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 676. Another court held that a parent-
child privilege prevented disclosure of confidential communications between parents and
children based on the right of privacy emanating from the federal and state constitu-
tions. People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716-17, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979), appeal dismissed 76 A.D.2d 843 (1980). Similarly, an Appellate Divi-
sion in New York stated that although creation of such a privilege rested with the legis-
lature, "communications made by a minor child to his parents ... may, under.some
circumstances, lie within the 'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."'
Application of A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978)(quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). In Application of A and M, the court
prefaced its finding with a discussion of such cases as Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (dealing with the protection of the
parent-child relationship); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(dealing with the right of
privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925). 61 A.D.2d at 430-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
25. Admittedly, one could argue in the privacy example that the legislature's failure
to include a particular type of case within the privacy statute represented a policy deci-
sion not to permit recovery in such situations. This might be the reasoning behind the
traditional common-law view of statutes. However, another possibility is that the legisla-
ture was dissatisfied with a court's refusal to allow recovery in one particular case and
merely failed to consider other situations that might arise.
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technique of strict construction.2 6 He noted that although the
common law was once perceived as superior to legislation be-
cause the common law arose from custom and supposedly car-
ried the consent of the governed, legislation was currently
viewed as "the more truly democratic form of lawmaking. '27 He
"submitted" that courts would "eventually" view statutes as
"superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general
subject .. ."" He concluded his 1908 article with the following
statement:
The new principles are in legislation. The old principles are in
common law. The former are as much to be respected and
made effective as the latter-probably more so as our legisla-
tion improves. The public cannot be relied upon permanently
to tolerate judicial obstruction or nullification of the social pol-
icies to which more and more it is compelled to be
committed.
2 9
While Pound's concept begins as an attempt to enhance the
legislature's influence on the development of law, his view con-
tains an element that potentially increases judicial power. Statu-
tory analogy requires a court to use its creative function, which
includes the idea that a court makes policy. In fact, the idea that
a court may go beyond a statute's meaning so long as it stays
within the underlying statutory purpose has found some accept-
ance as the doctrine of equitable construction"0 known as "gen-
erative interpretation." 31 Thus, the idea that a court may use a
statute's principle to extend the statute's terms leads to a re-
treat from the notion that only legislatures make policy.
Reed Dickerson has also recognized that courts have the
ability to extend legislative principles to situations not covered
by a statute.3 2 In his recent examination of the judicial function
in statutes, he concluded that a court's extension of a statute's
26. Pound, supra note 6, at 386.
27. Id. at 406.
28. Id. at 385-86.
29. Id. at 407.
30. See 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 359-62 (C. Sands
4th ed. 1972-73).
31. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpre-
tation in the Supreme Court, 95 H.Rv. L. Rav. 892, 893, 898 (1982). See also infra notes
52-56 and accompanying text.
32. R. DICKESON, supra note 4, at 201.
[Vol. 35
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principles is "conditioned only by principles appropriate to the
creative art of judicial lawmaking. 3 3 In 1959, Pound argued that
where statutory policy conflicts with common-law policy, a court
may resort to statutory policy as a rule of decision. Pound ad-
ded that "[liegislation is by no means so consistent in pursuing
and adhering to a policy as is judicial decision. 385 Witherspoon
observed that "Pound does not deal particularly with the prob-
lem of how the principle behind the statutory precept is to be
'discovered.' 3 " Thus, with statutory analogy, a court has the
difficult task of deriving the policy from a statute and refining
the policy to apply to a particular case.37 In addition, Pound
used the permissive form "may"38 and thus left to the courts the
decision of when to apply the principle of statutory analogy.39
At least two situations are possible. First, a statute may ap-
ply but not cover a specific situation. The court must then de-
cide whether to apply the statutory principle or traditional com-
mon-law principles. Second, a statute may have covered the area
so thoroughly that a court is bound to apply the statutory prin-
ciple to situations that the legislature did not directly cover.40
Accepted means of statutory interpretation permit a court to at-
tempt to follow the legislative will in these matters, but because
these questions arise only when a statute does not cover the
case, it is unlikely that legislative will would exist. Thus, these
decisions will usually involve the exercise of a large amount of
33. Id. at 201-02.
34. R. POUND, supra note 9, at 669-70. Pound's phrasing is noteworthy. He stated
that "where a policy is shown at variance with that received at common law, the policy
may be resorted to in analogous cases in order to choose a starting point for judicial
reasoning when [a] choice has to be made between starting points of equal authority."
Id. He meant, of course, that the courts may "resort" to the policy. His use of the passive
construction, however, fails to emphasize a court's creative role in the process.
35. Id. at 670.
36. Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning:
"The Middle Road": I, 40 TEx. L. REV.. 751, 771 (1962).
37. Pound asserted that "the statute is to stand as part of the legal system no less
than judicially found precepts of the common law, so that the principle it affords may be
used as the basis of reasoning no less than a principle afforded by cases decided upon a
policy which legislation has rejected." R. POUND, supra note 9, at 670. Once again, the
passive construction fails to emphasize a court's role in the process. See supra note 34.
Clearly, Pound's position reserves to a court the task of deciding when and how to use
statutory principles, as well as the task of defining or articulating those principles.
38. R. POUND, supra note 9, at 669-71.
39. See supra notes 33 and 37; Witherspoon, supra note 36, at 823-24.
40. Witherspoon, supra note 36, at 823-24.
19841
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judicial creativity. Given this judicial role, one is drawn to ac-
cept Witherspoon's statement of Pound's general theory on this
subject: "Pound's thesis . . is inherently directed toward pres-
ervation of judicial power to determine basic policy in adminis-
tration of statutes.
'41
Witherspoon strongly objected to the continued relegation
of statutory law to secondary status.42 He agreed that a court is
"a developer of statutory principle in the light of legislative pur-
poses, '4 s but argued that, when applicable, a statutory principle
must govern." He asserted that a "court is not free to reject the
statutory principle and replace it with a traditional law
principle.
4 5
In declaring the supremacy of legislative principles, Wither-
spoon's view appears to adopt Pound's first possible position,
that statutes be considered superior to judge-made law.46 Ac-
cording to Pound, this position is one to which the "course of
legal development . . must lead ...eventually. . . .,4 Like
Pound, Witherspoon's view allows a court substantial latitude to
make policy. For example, Witherspoon formulated the judicial
role in handling statutes as follows:
Thus, in the administration of statutory law a court assigns
meaning to that law as an attributer of purpose, a developer of
statutory principle in light of legislative purposes, a judicial
lawmaker, and an applier of rules that are kept responsive to
statutory principles, as necessary, by judicial law-making.48
Witherspoon criticized the proponents of statutory analogy for
their continued adherence to the traditional concept of statutory
interpretation in areas covered by a statute.49 In his view, those
41. Id. at 774. Witherspoon's conclusion is based on the assumption that traditional
"canons, rules, and presumptions" governing statutory application do not possess any
fixed content. Id. This assumption certainly illustrates the extent of the creative judicial
role as discussed here.
42. Id. at 831.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 847-48.
45. Id. at 848.
46. Pound, supra note 6, at 385.
47. Id. at 386.
48. Witherspoon, supra note 36, at 831.
49. Id. at 825. Witherspoon apparently regarded Pound's view-that courts may dis-
regard statutory principle-as limiting the operation of statutory analogy. In Wither-
spoon's view, the proponents of statutory analogy remained committed to the "historical
200 [Vol. 35
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advocates should question that concept generally. 0 Witherspoon
advocated, as a general theory, administering a statute according
to its principle whenever appropriate. 1 Thus, a court's creative
role, originally articulated for use in a limited number of cases,
becomes Witherspoon's basis for developing a general theory
governing statutory application. While a court may not reject a
statutory principle, 52 a "court or agency plays a significant role
in the formation of the principle in all cases."
5 3
Some writers ascribe to the courts a creative function that
greatly exceeds the notion that courts should apply statutes by
interpreting the words of the legislature. These writers view the
courts as substantial instruments of policy-creation. This view is
contained in Karl Llewellyn's conclusion that the judicial ap-
proach to statutes is much the same as its approach to case
law." Without making any claim that the courts generally have
adopted the creative role assigned to them by the proponents of
judicial creativity in administering statutes, several courts have
decided cases which reflect this idea.5
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 6 the United
States Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for wrongful
death in maritime law despite the absence of a statute creating
the right of action. The Court used the principle of statutory
analogy and articulated its application as follows:
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes [creating
a right of action for wrongful death], taken as a whole, make it
clear that there is no present public policy against allowing re-
covery for wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide rejec-
tion by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once
have existed for a general refusal to allow such recovery. This
purpose" of statutes. Id. at 846. Witherspoon suggested that a principle so bound to "a
particular historical occasion and a particular historical problem.., is of limited useful-
ness and moved its proponents, as it moved Dean Pound, to propose that courts be left
free to disregard it and to prefer the traditional law." Id.
50. Id. at 826, 831.
51. Id. at 834, 847-48.
52. Id. at 848.
53. Id. at 847.
54. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRAmTON 371-75, 377-82 (1960).
55. See infra notes 56-91 and accompanying text. According to some commentators,
the Supreme Court has retreated from exercising creativity in applying statutes. See
supra note 54; Note, supra note 31, at 898.
56. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
1984]
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legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond
the particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The pol-
icy thus established has become itself a part of our law, to be
given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory
construction but also in those of decisional law.
57
In writing for the Court in Moragne, Justice Harlan made ex-
plicit the Court's creative function in applying statutory policy
when he said: "It has always been the duty of the common-law
court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and
to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body
of common-law principles-many of them deriving from earlier
legislative exertions."5 8 Lest one take this language as a general
adoption of the doctrine of statutory analogy, the Court quickly
noted that not all statutes reflect the legislative expression of a
general policy.59 The Court then carefully limited its delibera-
tion to a determination of the legislative direction and explicitly
found "that Congress has given no affirmative indication of an
intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrong-
ful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner."8 0
In advocating that courts should use statutory rather than
common-law principles, Witherspoon discussed a number of
cases in which courts used these principles to reach their deci-
sions. 61 Accordingly to Witherspoon, one case that "shows a
marvelous command of the considerations bearing upon the ef-
57. Id. at 390-91.
58. Id. at 392.
59. Id. at 392-93.
60. Id. at 393. The Court's ability to limit the statutory analogy doctrine to appro-
priate cases corresponds with Dickerson's view. According to Dickerson, before extending
statutory principles to situations not covered by the applicable statutes, a court must
decide "whether the legislature has excluded judicial creativity by preempting the area
through negative implication." R. DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 201. For a discussion of
additional cases using the statutory analogy doctrine, see id. at 202-05.
Grant Gilmore suggests another limiting aspect of Moragne. He notes that Moragne
is based on admiralty jurisdiction, a field that "may be... uniquely committed to the
'judicial power'" by virtue of the admiralty and maritime jurisdictional provision of arti-
cle III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Con-
text, 4 VT. L. REv. 233, 241 (1979).
61. Witherspoon, supra note 36 at 835-45. These cases are Goldberg v. Whitaker
House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S.
381 (1939); Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
969 (1960); The T. J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); and
Kirschwing v. O'Donnell, 120 Colo. 125, 207 P.2d 819 (1949).
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fectuation of statutory principles 6 2 is Wilko v. Swan . 3 In
Wilko, a customer sued his stock brokers for damages pursuant
to the Securities Act of 1933.4 Relying on section 3 of the
United States Arbitration Act 5 and the fact that the customer
had signed margin agreements providing for arbitration, the bro-
kers sought to stay the trial pending arbitration.6 Their argu-
ment uncovered a possible conflict with a provision in the Secur-
ities Act of 193367 that declared void any contractual terms
providing for a waiver of compliance with the Act. The Supreme
Court found that the Securities Act represented a legislative pol-
icy of full disclosure to protect investors. To effectuate this pol-
icy, Congress provided a right of action for misrepresentation
which was significantly different from the common-law right.6 8
Simultaneously, the Court also recognized that the United
States Arbitration Act represented the "desirability of arbitra-
tion as an alternative to the complications of litigation." 69
After discussing in some detail the purposes behind the two
conflicting requirements, the Court concluded:
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this
case. Congress has afforded participants in transactions subject
to its legislative power an opportunity generally to secure
prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies
through arbitration if the parties are willing to accept less cer-
tainty of legally correct adjustment. On the other hand, it has
enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of investors
and has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights. Recognizing
the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may pro-
vide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide
that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities
is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the Act.70
62. Witherspoon, supra note 36 at 843.
63. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1976). The suit was brought under § 12(2) of the Securities
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
65. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
66. 346 U.S. at 429.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
68. 346 U.S. at 430-31.
69. Id. at 431.
70. Id. at 438 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
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Apparently, the Court concluded that although the protective
provisions of the Securities Act would apply in arbitration, those
provisions would be more effective in a judicial forum. 1 While
the Court ascribed its conclusion to the intention of the legisla-
ture, Witherspoon is probably correct in referring to this case as
an example of the Court's use of statutory principles. The
Court's use of principles was necessary to resolve a conflict be-
tween two applicable statutes rather than as a reflection of a
general commitment to use statutory principles as a doctrine of
statutory construction. Wilko nevertheless demonstrates that
courts have the ability to use statutory principles when deciding
cases.
Another case that Witherspoon discussed, Keifer & Keifer
v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,2 addressed the question of
whether a government corporation, the Regional Agricultural
Credit Corporation, was amenable to suit despite the absence of
specific statutory authorization. The Court concluded that it
was.73 Although Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion used
traditional interpretative language, he indicated clearly that the
Court used a statutory principle (as that term is used in this
Article) to arrive at its conclusion. After stating that the ques-
tion was whether Congress had granted the corporation immu-
nity from suit, he observed:
The Congressional will must be divined, and by a process of
interpretation which, in effect, is the ascertainment of policy
immanent not merely in the single statute from which flow the
rights and responsibilities of Regional, but in a series of stat-
utes utilizing corporations for governmental purposes and
drawing significance from dominant contemporaneous opinion
regarding the immunity of governmental agencies from suit.7 4
In other words, a rule of decision may emerge from a statute
even though the rule would not necessarily hold under tradi-
tional notions of administering statutes. Noting that Congress
had established at least forty government corporations with
which it "without exception" had endowed the capacity "to-sue-
71. Id. at 435.
72. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
73. Id. at 397.
74. Id. at 389.
204 [Vol. 35
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and-be-sued, '75 Justice Frankfurter seized upon a "definite atti-
tude"7 6 of Congress and found that Congress had "naturally as-
sumed" that the corporation could be sued.7 7 Still shielding his
use of statutory principle with the language of traditional inter-
pretation, Frankfurter concluded that to hold the corporation
immune from suit would be "to impute to Congress a desire for
incoherence in a body of affiliated enactments and for drastic
legal differentiation where policy justifies none. A fair judgment
of the statute in its entire setting relieves us from making such
an imputation of caprice.17
8
Despite the traditional language in Keifer, the case and its
conclusion seem very similar to Moragne, in which Justice
Harlan, on behalf of the court, openly used the concept of statu-
tory analogy.79 There are, of course, other examples of the judi-
cial use of statutory principle.80 For instance, in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,"' the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether section 301 of the Taft-Harley Act8 2 was merely juris-
dictional, that is, whether that section gave federal district
courts the power to hear particular cases without regard to the
normal jurisdictional requirements of diversity and amount in
controversy, or whether it also conferred upon federal courts the
power "to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
labor-management agreements. 8 3 Adopting the latter construc-
tion of section 301,84 the Court found that the provision ex-
pressed a "federal policy that federal courts should enforce these
75. Id. at 390.
76. Id. at 391.
77. Id. at 393.
78. Id. at 394.
79. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
80. See also Witherspoon, supra note 36, at 844-45 (looking behind the opinion in
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961)). Witherspoon concluded
that "[w]hile the majority does not articulate the support for what it was doing, it may
reasonably be concluded that it viewed the concepts of employer and employee as prop-
erly to be administered consistently with a decisional principle developed by the admin-
istrator and subsequently elevated to the dignity of a statutory principle by an amend-
ment to the statute." Id. at 845.
81. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
83. 353 U.S. at 450-51. Section 301 stated only that suits for violations of labor-
management agreements could be brought in federal court.
84. Id. at 451.
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agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations.""5
Lincoln Mills left federal courts to develop the law gov-
erning enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. Two
critics of the decision argued that federal courts would be forced
to create that law using primarily the "common law of commer-
cial contracts," with the scant assistance of bits and pieces of
statutory commands.8 ' After all, the specific question in Lincoln
Mills was whether to enforce an agreement to arbitrate that was
contained in a collective-bargaining agreement. The court of ap-
peals could find support in neither applicable state law nor in
federal law to permit enforcement.
8 7
The notion that federal courts would look to state law
raised serious constitutional problems.8 8 Thus, when determin-
ing the source of federal law, Justice Douglas' majority opinion
in Lincoln Mills stated that courts "must fashion" governing law
"from the policy of our national labor laws." 9 If answers could
not be found in the Taft-Harley Act, then they would lie in the
"penumbra of express statutory mandates."90 Reaching the idea
of statutory principle, Justice Douglas noted that problems
which "lack express statutory sanction ... will be solved by
85. Id. at 455.
86. Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lin-
coln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 22 (1957)(footnote omitted).
87. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 88 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
88. See 353 U.S. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The notion that federal
courts could not grant specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate compounded
the problem. See Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 139
(D. Mass. 1953). In fact, the United States Arbitration Act specifically excludes "con-
tracts of employment ... of workers engaged in interstate commerce" from its coverage.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). In American Thread, Judge Wyzanski concluded that the authority
to enforce the agreement to arbitrate could come either by constructing § 301 as a direc-
tive to the federal courts to fashion federal common law governing collective bargaining
agreements, or at least as a directive to apply local law with respect to substantive ques-
tions. 113 F. Supp. at 139-40. He found neither interpretation totally adequate and
stated that a court could not know whether to apply federal or local law under § 301
until after the Supreme Court decided the issue. Id. at 141. Finally, Judge Wyzanski held
that the agreement could be enforced because a contract to arbitrate would be enforcea-
ble under Massachusetts law and because, given the legislative purpose of § 301, Con-
gress intended for the federal courts to enforce such agreements regardless of state law.
Id. Justice Frankfurter disputed Judge Wyzanski's suggestion that the federal courts
could satisfy the federal case requirement of article III of the Constitution by incorporat-
ing state law by reference. 353 U.S. at 473-74 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89. 353 U.S. at 456.
90. Id. at 457.
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looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy
that will effectuate that policy.""' In other words, a federal court
working with a statute or series of statutes would possess broad
authority to create and apply statutory principles. The power
recognized in Lincoln Mills, however, is tied to a particular stat-
utory provision and cannot be taken to constitute a general
holding on the scope of judicial power in the administration of
statutes. Nevertheless, the case does illustrate that American ju-
risprudence recognizes that courts have substantial power to
reason from the express terms of statutory enactments.
Thus, although not a common rule of practice, a respectable
concept lies embedded in our jurisprudence which allows courts
to enhance their substantial lawmaking powers by using statu-
tory principles, even in areas governed by statutes. From that
point the next step seems small and not surprising. Recently, a
Minnesota state senator, Jack Davies, proposed a bill which, if
passed, would declare that all statutes-twenty years after their
enactment-should be treated as judicial precedent, subject to
judicial revocation and modification to the same extent as case
law.92 Under this so-called "Nonprimacy of Statutes Act," courts
would be expected to respond to both the advocates' demands
for justice and to authority drawn from legislation, judicial
precedents, scholarly studies, and Brandeis briefs.9 3 Grant Gil-
more, on the basis of his conclusion that "[t]he urgent problem
in the 1970's is how to get out of the statutory box[,]" found
Davies' proposal meritorious because it allows a court to extri-
cate itself from statutory excesses openly and without "resort to
the self-defeating techniques of misconstruction and
constitutionalization.
'' 94
Guido Calabresi has also addressed the judicial treatment of
statutes in the development of the law.95 Calabresi favors "the
91. Id. Justice Douglas suggested that "[tihe range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem." He also stated that state law could be used if
compatible with § 301, although it would be "absorbed as federal law." Id.
92. Davies, supra note 4, at 205.
93. Id.
94. Gilmore, supra note 60, at 245. Davies argues that "resort to constitutional law
to correct legislative error creates a legal rigidity that is worse than statutory obsoles-
cence." Davies, supra note 4, at 228.
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candid acceptance of the power of courts to treat certain stat-
utes as having no more, and no less, authority than common-law
precedents."9 He suggests that courts now covertly engage in
what Davies would forthrightly allow.97 Calabresi also believes
that courts should select, through careful judgment, those stat-
utes which they will treat as common-law precedents.98 Although
he does recognize that there are some statutes for which com-
mon-law judicial development would be an inadequate substi-
tute, Calabresi suggests that courts must discover and use tech-
niques to obtain legislative reconsideration. 9
In his 1977 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures, 100 Calabresi
emphasized that whatever course the courts follow, the legisla-
tures, except where constitutional guarantees are involved, must
retain the last word.10' The main judicial function is to decide
when to fashion new law because old statutes no longer fit the
present legal framework. 0 2 By acting in this common-law capac-
ity, courts would allow the legislatures to assert their will, which
is that of a majoritarian or representative body.103 If the judici-
ary cannot bring statutory law into harmony with the legal
framework, Calabresi suggests that the courts should use tech-
niques devised to stimulate legislative or administrative rewrit-
ing. 104 Courts can operate with "honesty and candor"'105 when
the legal community acknowledges that courts have a common-
law function to decide when statutes are so out of harmony with
the existing legal framework that a presumption should exist
against their retention.'
Both Davies' proposal for a Nonprimacy of Statutes Act and
Calabresi's suggestion of an expanded common-law function for
courts in dealing with statutes represent an expansive notion of
the proper judicial role. Their ideas also represent a belief that
96. Id.
97. Id. at 252-53.
98. Id. at 253-54.
99. Id. at 251-52.
100. Those lectures have since been published in G. CALABREsJ, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
101. Id. at 164.
102. Id. at 164.
103. Id. at 163-64.
104. Id. at 164-65.
105. Id. at 178-80.
106. Id. at 164.
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courts must play a substantial policymaking role in areas osten-
sibly covered by statutes.
The statement that courts make policy when dealing with
statutes fails to add anything not previously accepted. 0 7 But in
the context of reducing statutes to the level of common-law
precedents,108 that statement suggests a considerably broader
notion of judicial creativity than that permitted by the prevail-
ing view of legislative supremacy. 09 One can argue that the exis-
tence of a Nonprimacy of Statutes Act would obviate the separa-
tion of powers problem because a court would, in effect, simply
exercise its authority to carry out that legislative enactment.1 0
On the other hand, such an act would alter the authoritative na-
ture of statutes and, in effect, change the nature of power consti-
107. See, e.g., R. DICKEHSON, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the problems in legisla-
tive interpretation); Gilmore, supra note 60, at 239 (discussing the technique of miscon-
struction); Murphy, supra note 5, at 1317 (where he states: "The relationship of legisla-
ture and court cannot be solely one of command. In large areas it must be one of
delegation and the legislature should be able to rely on the courts to use their good sense
to carry out the delegation in the light of unforeseen circumstances."). See also Traynor,
The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L. REV. 1, 2 (1977)(describing limits of judi-
cial creativity).
108. See Calabresi, supra note 95, at 247. Of course, Calabresi continues to advocate
ultimate legislative supremacy, and this statement must be viewed as a way of describing
the courts' creative role. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 100, at 164. Davies also accepts
ultimate legislative supremacy. See Davies, supra note 4, at 206.
109. See, e.g., R. DIcKmsON, supra note 4, at 7-8. Dickerson notes that if a court
applies a statute more restrictively than would result from "judicial cognition," the court
subverts the act of the legislature, thus impairing legislative supremacy in substantive
policymaking. Id. at 205. "Judicial cognition" refers to the act "of quarrying meaning
from the original enactment," id. at 127, or, in other words "extracting meaning from the
statutory text and its proper context." Id. at 136. See also id. at 15 (legislature constitu-
tionally entitled to preeminence in policy formulation).
110. Davies emphasizes that under his proposal, the legislature retains the power to
reenact a statute after judicial modification. Thus, the legislature could give an old statu-
tory rule, judicially disregarded or modified, another twenty years of life. Davies, supra
note 4, at 222. Furthermore, Davies argues that the Nonprimacy of Statutes Act would
not dissipate legislative power because the Act is always subject to legislative change. Id.
at 223. On the constitutional issue, Davies asserts that his proposal "[c]learly ... does
not involve legislative or executive violation of the separation of powers doctrine, for
under it those branches can do only what they do now." Id. at 224. In his view, the
judiciary would merely perform its usual role of deciding cases and creating precedents.
Id. at 225. The only difference is that twenty years after enactment, the primacy of a
statute is withdrawn and the judiciary reverts to its pre-enactment role in deciding cases
previously governed by the statute. Even after twenty years, however, the courts must
still accord the statute "persuasive" authority. Id. Thus, Davies argues that his proposal
adds nothing more than a termination date with the proviso that the courts may retain
what is good in the statute after its termination. Id. at 225 n.67.
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tutionally bestowed on a legislature. One could then make an
equally forceful argument that the Nonprimacy of Statutes Act
would require a constitutional amendment to be valid.
The rationale behind Davies' proposal is that a court is in a
better position to resolve policy questions in the area governed
by a statute twenty years after the statute's enactment.111 This
rationale actually attacks the concept that rules can be articu-
lated to govern future behavior. Davies would counter that his
proposal would "turn the courtroom into a forum in which old
and unjust statutes can be updated," and claimants can "obtain
retroactive judicial relief from out-of-date legislative law. 11 ,
At least implicitly, Davies seems to agree with Calabresi
that the process must be selective. 1 3 But even as a selection
technique, a court's disregard of the legislative policy, because
the court views itself as better equipped to make the policy
judgment embodied in the statute, wars with the fundamental
notion of legislation. Such a value judgment should not pass un-
noted and should not be accepted without far more justification
than that which Davies offers.
Probably a more important factor behind Davies' and Cala-
bresi's proposals is a perceived legislative inability to engage in
law reform on a continuing basis. 11 4 Davies believes that legisla-
tors "do not have the time, energy, or intellectual resources to
diagnose legal problems and to construct solutions" because they
act primarily in response to requests from the public.1 5 He also
emphasizes that requests for legislation tend to be for "precise
responses to specific problems" and often lead to "new statutes
[that] will be so detailed that their obsolescence, barring later
amendment, is nearly inevitable." 16 Grant Gilmore suggests
that the problem of adjusting statutes to changed circumstances
stems in part from the 1930's style of very precisely drafting
statutes117 and, in part, from an accelerated volume of legislative
111. Id. at 208.
112. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114. Davies, supra note 4, 227-29. Calabresi suggests that important, deeply held
values may hinder any effort to remove the legislative inertia that prevents revision of
outdated statutes. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 100, at 70-72.
115. Davies, supra note 4, at 229.
116. Id.
117. Gilmore, supra note 60, at 238.
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activity in the 1950's.11 8 Other commentators have similarly crit-
icized legislative inability to revise or reform legislation on a
continuing basis, 119 or to do more than react in the way of policy
creation.120 As Judge Henry Friendly stated: "I. . .do not at all
lament the diminished role of the judge vis-a-vis the legislature
as a maker of law. What I do lament is that the legislator has
diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast fields and
then has failed to keep them ploughed.
' 121
From this summary the view emerges that courts should ex-
pand their lawmaking function well beyond that generally ac-
cepted today. This is true even if the generally accepted level of
judicial creativity includes those decisions made in cases where
the policy .that should apply cannot be derived from the usual
materials used in statutory interpretation. The notion that
courts must play a significant role in creating policy stems partly
from a perceived legislative inadequacy and partly from the
common-law tradition of viewing courts as the ultimate crafters
of legal principles through a process of legal reasoning. Regard-
less of the intellectual antecedents, a substantial segment of re-
spectable opinion believes that the courts should have a signifi-
118. Id. at 239.
119. See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787, 792-96 (1963); Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation:
An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 334-35 (1976). Judge Friendly pointed out
that both "the ailment and the cure"-law revision agencies or commissions--"have
been known for well over a century." Friendly, supra at 802. Justice Traynor has also
suggested that legislatures should use law revision commissions. Traynor, supra note
107, at 3.
120. See Sentell, Statutes of Nonstatutory Origin, 14 GA. L. REv. 239, 239-40
(1980); Traynor, supra note 107, at 2. Traynor also discusses the legislative failure "to
deal with controversial issues." Id. at 8. On this point, he observes that "[lI]egislators
have become astute at turning a deaf ear to highly visible issues on which they do not
wish to gamble their political lives." Id. One might infer a similar criticism, specifically
aimed at Congress, from the following remark contained in Justice Frankfurter's dissent-
ing opinion in Lincoln Mills: "We cannot return this provision to Congress and respect-
fully request that body to face the responsibility placed upon it by the Constitution to
define the jurisdiction of the lower courts with some particularity and not to leave these
courts at large." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 484 (1957)(Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
121. Friendly, supra note 119, at 792. Friendly has expressed the same thought in
different words: "My criticism is directed. .. at cases in which the legislature has said
enough to deprive the judges of power to make law. . .but has given them guidance
that is defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way of remedy when
the problem comes to light." Id.
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cant lawmaking function. 12 2 This position may be an argument
for writing a constitution that vests legislative power in both
courts and legislatures.
B. Legislative Supremacy and Denial of a Judicial
Policymaking Role
In contrast to the well-developed ideas about judicial crea-
tivity in statutory administration, a strong strain of American
legal thought denies that courts should occupy a policy-making
role in areas substantially governed by statutes. Most lawyers
accept legislative supremacy as the basis of the judicial function
in applying statutes. 123 Thus, legislative supremacy underlies
much of the thought regarding the proper judicial approach in
performing this function.1 24 In fact, the premise of legislative
supremacy leads logically to the conclusion that a court should
limit its role to the ascertainment of what the legislature has
done, a process usually described as discovering the "intention"
of the legislature.1 25 A court will look to statutory language, read
in light of the legislative purpose,1 26 and justify its decision as
what was or was not "intended.' 1 27 This strain of thought, that
courts should not make policy in areas governed by statutes, ex-
ists side-by-side with the concepts discussed in the preceding
and subsequent sections.
122. See Note, supra note 31, at 913-15.
123. See Gilmore, supra note 60, at 233; Murphy, supra note 5, at 1299. Both use
the term "article of faith" in referring to the acceptance of legislative supremacy. Id.
124. See, e.g., Kernochan, supra note 119, at 345.
125. See J. DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 243 (1975); H.
READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 764 (3d ed.
1975); Kernochan, supra note 119, at 345, 346; Murphy, supra note 5, at 1299. "Inten-
tion" as used in this Article refers to a purpose-oriented approach to construing legisla-
tive language. See Kernochan, supra note 119, at 348. See also Bickel and Wellington,
supra note 86, at 15-16.
126. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 617 F.2d 485, 490 (7th
Cir. 1980).
127. See, e.g., id. at 494; Coffman, Essay on Statutory Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 57, 58 (1978). Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in FHA v. The Darling-
ton, 358 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1958), contains an example of this approach. After noting that
the "immediate problem" presented "the usual question of statutory construction where
language is not clear enough to preclude human ingenuity from creating ambiguity[,]" he
said: "It is outside the judicial function to add to the scope of legislation. The task is
imaginatively to extrapolate the contemporaneous answer that the Legislature would
have given to an unconsidered question. . . ." Id. at 92.
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Doubts that courts actually use legislative intention in de-
ciding cases may accompany the expression of legislative
supremacy as an article of faith.128 In addition, cases will arise in
which the legislature: (1) could not possibly have foreseen the
situation, or (2) has used terms so vague that the inference
arises that the legislature intended for the courts to formulate
policy. In these situations, "the duty of a court to effectuate leg-
islative purpose becomes identical with a general obligation of
the courts to formulate a consistent and coherent body of
law." 29 The next section discusses judicial creativity in the in-
terpretation of statutes. This section discusses the view that
courts should not make policy in areas in which the legislature
has acted."
Professor Gilmore suggests that the notion of legislative
supremacy developed late in the nineteenth century and gained
widespread popularity during the statutory reform of the
1920's.130 Rules designed both to require and enable courts to
follow legislative intention rest on the theory that courts should
apply legislatively established policy.13 1 Thus, on one level legis-
lative supremacy reflects a value judgment that either legisla-
tures produce substantively better law than courts, or that legis-
lature-made law is more consistent with democratic ideals than
judge-made law.
In 1908, Roscoe Pound, in comparing common law to legis-
lation, said: "We recognize that legislation is the more truly
democratic form of lawmaking. We see in legislation the more
direct and accurate expression of the general will. '" 2 Recently,
in discussing statutory interpretation and legislative supremacy,
128. See, e.g., Bickel and Wellington, supra note 86, at 17; Murphy, supra note 5, at
1299. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306
U.S. 381 (1939), frames the Court's inquiry as what the legislature intended, but the
Court's actual decision engaged in the creation of law by analogy to other statutes. See
supra notes 72-79 and accompanying discussion. Some commentators have attacked the
entire concept that courts should ascertain legislative policy by searching for legislative
intent. See, e.g., Bishin, supra note 3; Lehman, How To Interpret A Difficult Statute,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 489, 500-01.
129. Wellington and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A
Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1550-51 (1963)(footnote omitted).
See Lehman, supra note 128, at 501.
130. Gilmore, supra note 60, at 233-36.
131. See J. DAviEs, supra note 125, at 243; Coffman, supra note 127, at 83; Kerno-
chan, supra note 119, at 345.
132. Pound, supra note 6, at 406 (footnote omitted).
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another commentator observed:
One of the most fundamental interests to be observed is
that of a proper respect for the role of the legislature, which
flows from the basic notion of self-government through the
democratic process. Courts should not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislature. We
see in legislation the more direct and accurate expression of
the general will. The attempt in the main, therefore, should be
to adopt the interpretation which promotes the underlying
purposes and policies of the statute. 13
The idea that courts should defer to the legislature in ad-
ministering statutes rests on a fundamental democratic premise.
Professor Kernochan, in setting forth legislative supremacy as
"our fundamental interpretive guideline," declared that "a con-
stitutional tenet of our Anglo-American legal system [is] that
the elected representative legislature is supreme in lawmak-
ing."113' Doubts about judicial policymaking stem from this over-
riding belief in democracy,13 5 and judicial lawmaking, apart from
the constitutional law area, tends to find justification in the no-
tion that the legislature remains free to repair any havoc the
133. Coffman, supra note 127, at 83 (footnote omitted).
134. Kernochan, supra note 119, at 345 (emphasis added). See also Wallace, The
Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1, 8 (1981). Judge Wallace states that "to avoid usurping the policymaking role of demo-
cratically elected bodies and officials, a judge should always be ... cautious to supple-
ment or modify statutes when construing them." Judge Wallace is a Judge on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. That statement described the "conception of judicial re-
straint," which he portrayed as "a philosophy that most effectively preserves fundamen-
tal constitutional precepts." Id. at 16.
135. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). Bickel states concern-
ing the Supreme Court resolving issues of principle: "But contemporaneous doubts are
rooted in the democratic faith, which holds that the society at large ought to participate
in the venture of governing itself...." Id. at 105. He then observes, drawing support
from the wisdom of Roscoe Pound, that because law may not always be self-executing,
law is limited in resolving political and social issues. Id. at 106. In supporting their argu-
ment that a court should not decide certain issues in particular circumstances, Welling-
ton and Albert draw on "the proposition that resolution of contested issues touching
upon sensitive areas of our social and economic life should be made by the electorally
based and therefore responsive political institutions." Wellington and Albert, supra note
129, at 1563. Recently, in a well-considered proposal for circumscribing the Supreme
Court's use of judicial review, Professor Jesse H. Choper relied heavily on the value of
majoritarianism in shaping his recommendations. See J. CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESs 2, 58-59, 170 (1980).
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courts wreak."3 6
In his classic law review article on statutory interpretation,
Justice Frankfurter translated democratic values into judicial
role requirements:
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large.
They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial func-
tion in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation.
They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial func-
tion in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal recogni-
tion certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in constru-
ing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our de-
mocracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges
have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for dis-
cipline in observing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite a
statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever tempta-
tions the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He
must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out
except to avoid patent nonsense or internal con-
tradiction .... 137
Llewellyn roundly criticized Frankfurter for disclaiming a crea-
tive judicial role in handling statutes,138 but quickly added that
"this formal self-prostration before the legislative power ...
seem[s] to me rather typical. .... 139
The value that policymaking is a legislative function and
that a court should confine itself to applying the statute in ac-
136. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 4 (1980). Of course, some decisions
will make legislative reaction difficult. See Bickel and Wellington, supra note 86, at 17.
At the same time, legislative inaction is arguably the deliberate product of the popular
will.
137. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 533 (1947).
138.
Frankfurter writes, talks, thinks, and feels in the case law bailiwick or in that
of such broader Constitutional provisions as "due process" in the Holmes tra-
dition of conscious and responsible, although ordered and restrained, creation;
but on a point of statutory construction he can write in a fog or phantasmago-
ria of fictional legislative intent and of a judicial powerlessness and consequent
non- or irresponsibility that forfeits all intellectual contact with the Grand
Tradition of case law.
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cordance with the original legislative language is reflected, or at
least used, in numerous cases.14 0 Dissenters have also used this
value to criticize the court's interpretation of a statute.1 41 Such
criticism often involves the charge that the court failed to follow
"the explicit language of the statute.1 1 42 One difficulty with this
approach, however, is that if circumstances change after a stat-
ute's enactment, then application of the statute as written may
produce a greater substantive policy change than a result that
departs from the statute's literal language.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,1 43 for example, the Supreme
Court faced the issue of "whether a live, human-made micro-
organism is patentable subject matter.11 44 The applicable statute
provided: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
140. See, e.g., FTC v. Bunte Bro3., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941)(opinion of the Court by
Frankfurter, J.); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926)(opinion of the Court by
Brandeis, J.); Gregory v. FDIC, 631 F.2d 896, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reversing in part
470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533
(D.C. Cir. 1978); id. at 538-41 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
141. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), for example, the Su-
preme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1976), does not prohibit all private affirmative action that prefers blacks over
whites in employment. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan relied, in part, on the
"'familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers."' 443 U.S. at
201 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). He
also relied on the "background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical
context from which the Act arose." 443 U.S. at 201.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, sharply criticized the Court for making policy.
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a Mem-
ber of Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title VIL I cannot join
the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the explicit language
of the statute and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-estab-
lished principles of separation of powers. Under the guise of statutory "con-
struction," the Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve what it regards as
a desirable result. It "amends" the statute to do precisely what both its spon-
sors and its opponents agreed the statute was not intended to do.
Id. at 216 (emphasis in original). He observed that difficult cases "tempt judges to ex-
ceed the limits of their authority," and drew on the wisdom of Cardozo to warn the
Court about the dangers of using "unauthorized" means to reach desirable results. Id. at
218-19.
142. United States Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979)(Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
143. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
144. Id. at 305.
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for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."'" 5
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that
such micro-organisms were patentable. 146 He began with the
statute's language and then used its ordinary meaning, buttress-
ing the entire interpretation with the policy that courts should
not supply limitations on patent laws absent legislative
expression. 
147
The government argued in Chakrabarty that Congress
should decide whether patent protection should be extended to
man-made living organisms. 148 The government emphasized that
Congress did not contemplate genetic technology when it en-
acted the statute in question.149 The Court, however, rejected
the idea that patent protection should be confined to subject
matter contemplated by the legislators who enacted the provi-
sion. 150 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, in which three
other members of the Court joined, concluded that: "It is the
role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach
of the patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the
composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates matters
of public concern.'
151
How a value is actually used in any particular case is likely
to be complicated. In many cases, the value that courts should
follow statutory language will require that the legislature, not
the courts, should make policy. In other cases, such as
Chakrabarty, judicial adherence to statutory language arguably
results in judicial, not legislative, policymaking. 52 As Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion indicates, there is room to exercise
some judgment about whether the legislature or a court should
be the body to make the decision in any particular instance. Be-
cause a particular method of interpreting statutes may lead to
judicial creativity in one instance, but restraint in another, a
145. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
146. 447 U.S. at 308.
147. Id. Two years earlier in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978), the Court
stated that it "must proceed cautiously when... asked to extend patent rights into
areas wholly unforseen by Congress."
148. 447 U.S. at 314.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 315-16.
151. Id. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. For another illustration see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In
particular compare id. at 485 with id. at 501-02.
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principle of statutory construction rarely gives a decision the
clear direction precedent does. Principles of statutory interpre-
tation usually serve to aid the decisional process, but unlike sub-
stantive rules of law, they are not governors of the decision.153 Of
course, policy reasons, other than those concerning the proper
function of courts in interpreting statutes, often play a role in a
decision. Still, this idea concerning a court's proper role in inter-
preting statutes has an effect, even if it is only one of many
forces operating on a judge.
In addition to the democratic ideal, other factors may influ-
ence a court not to extend a statute through interpretation. For
example, the notion that Congress should decide matters chang-
ing a federal/state power distribution lay behind the Supreme
Court's refusal to extend a statute's meaning in FTC v. Bunte
Brothers.154 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated
that such "[a]n inroad upon local conditions and local stan-
dards" as would result from the statute's extension "ought to
await a clearer mandate from Congress.
'155
Also, a court may decline to extend a statute if the decision
would require the court to fashion new principles to govern the
extension.156 Recently, the Supreme Court refused to allow a
right of contribution among co-conspirators in an antitrust
case.157 Although the Court recognized that it possessed the
power to create "federal common law" to protect "uniquely fed-
eral interests" where Congress has given the court power to cre-
ate substantive law,158 the Court refused to take a position on
the right of contribution in such cases. 15 19 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for a unanimous Court, explained the Court's refusal to
act:
The range of factors to be weighed in deciding whether a
right to contribution should exist demonstrates the inappropri-
ateness of judicial resolution of this complex issue. Ascertain-
153. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); Neuberger v. CIR, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
154. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
155. Id. at 355.
156. See, e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir.
1978)(Wright, C.J., concurring).
157. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 .(1981).
158. Id. at 640.
159. Id. at 646-47.
218 [Vol. 35
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss2/2
LIMITS ON JUDICIAL CREATIVITY
ing what is "fair" in this setting calls for inquiry into the entire
spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the elements of a partic-
ular case or category of cases. Similarly, whether contribution
would strengthen or weaken enforcement of the antitrust laws,
or what form a right to contribution should take, cannot be
resolved without going beyond the record of a single
lawsuit. .... 1e0
Ideas about legislative supremacy also influence thought
about the proper judicial treatment of prior statutory interpre-
tations. Accordingly, once a court interprets a statute, the statu-
tory meaning becomes fixed and the courts must not overrule
the original interpreting decision.161 Justice Black, for example,
believed that only in extraordinary circumstances should a court
overrule a prior statutory interpretation.1 6 2 For the courts to
change the original interpretation is considered "gratuitous" and
amounts to judicial usurpation of the legislative function.6 3 Jus-
tice Black noted:
It is the Congress, not this Court, that responds to the pres-
sures of political groups, pressures entirely proper in a free so-
ciety. it is Congress, not this Court, that has the capacity to
investigate the divergent considerations involved in the man-
agement of a complex national labor policy. And it is Congress,
not this Court, that is elected by the people. This Court
should, therefore, interject itself as little as possible into the
law-making and law-changing process. Having given our view
on the meaning of a statute, our task is concluded, absent ex-
traordinary circumstances....
160. Id.
161. E. L.vi, supra note 4, at 32-33.
Where legislative interpretation is concerned therefore, it appears that legal
reasoning does attempt to fix the meaning of the word. When this is done,
subsequent cases must be decided upon the basis that the prior meaning re-
mains. It must not be re-worked. Its meaning is made clear as examples are
seen, but the reference is fixed. It is a hard doctrine against which judges fre-
quently rebel....
Id. at 33.
162. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
256-60 (1970)(Black, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 257-58.
164. Id. at 258. Justice Jackson expressed similar thoughts in a slightly different
context. Dissenting in part from the Court's holding that the insurance business consti-
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Thus, one can find in the legal literature strong notions of a
restricted role for courts in dealing with statutes. By contrast,
section A of this part presented the courts' creative function
concerning statutes as resembling the courts' common-law func-
tion. Under the latter view, the courts continue to play a large or
even superior role in policy creation in order to construct a sys-
tem of law. Hence, there are two conflicting traditions in
America jurisprudence concerning the proper judicial approach
to statutes: one supports, and the other denies, the courts a cre-
ative policymaking role.
Judicial creativity in the development of common-law rules,
of course, does not receive the criticism directed at judicial crea-
tivity in statutory areas. At the same time, statutes play a more
significant role in today's legal system than they did in the early
part of this century.16 5 In the federal system, almost the entire
workload of federal courts dealing with federal law involves what
could be considered statutory areas."6 8 Thus, the federal courts'
creation and development of federal law is almost always viewed
as antithetical to legislative supremacy.
The partnership view of courts and legislators discussed in
Section A illustrates the extent to which some commentators be-
lieve courts should develop policy in statutory areas. That sec-
tion does not deal with statutory interpretation, but rather with
the creation of law in an areas considered the legislature's do-
main. It is the legislature's domain efther because the legislature
has prescribed rules in the area without directly touching the
subject matter of the case, or because it is thought that the legis-
lature alone is empowered to act. Under this view, where legisla-
A judgment as to when the evil of a decisional error exceeds the evil of an
innovation must be based on very practical and in part upon policy considera-
tions. When, as in this problem, such practical and political judgments can be
made by the political branches of the Government, it is the part of wisdom and
self-restraint and good government for courts to leave the initiative to
Congress.
Moreover, this is the method of responsible democratic government. To
force the hand of Congress is no more the proper function of the judiciary than
to tie the hands of Congress....
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 534 (1944).
165. See Gilmore, supra note 60, at 237-39.
166. Compare Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)("There is no general federal common law.") with Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640 (1981)(federal common-law areas are very limited).
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tion seems inadequate, courts develop the law rather than make
poor decisions based on outmoded or underdeveloped legislation.
Those who believe that courts occupy a creative role equal to, or
greater than, the legislature in the development of law also tend
to support a creative judicial role in statutory interpretation and
application. Thus, the partnership-with-the-legislature '67 view
stands as an extreme claim of a creative judicial function and
differs significantly from the view that proceeds from legislative
supremacy. But even those who begin with legislative supremacy
cannot always decide a case involving a statute's interpretation
by simply applying the legislature's language. Even they must
deal with the creative function of the courts,'68 albeit on a more
limited basis. In any event, there are those who support the ex-
ercise of judicial creativity apart from the view of the judicial
role in statutory areas discussed in section A.
C. Judicial Creativity in Statutory Interpretation
Just as, perforce, the musical composer delegates some
subordinate creative activity to musical performers, so, per-
force, the legislature delegates some subordinate (judicial) leg-
islation-i.e., creative activity-to the courts.169
With these words Judge Jerome N. Frank conveyed an im-
age of restrained creativity subject to the legislature's higher au-
thority. While the courts still perform a creative function under
Frank's image, the judicial function is more restrained than the
lawmaking partnership discussed in section A of this part. That
section considered the creative judicial function in areas sub-
stantially governed by statutes, including the use of statutes by
analogy and other approaches similar to the courts' lawmaking
function in common-law development. While the creativity dis-
cussed in that section differs only in degree from that discussed
167. Of course, it is difficult to clearly delimit the extent of judicial policymaking.
The partnership view does not usually surface in discussions of common law. Rather, the
partnership view becomes an issue when courts consider cases arising out of those areas
over which the legislature has exercised jurisdiction, but has not resolved all of the policy
issues.
168. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 14-15; H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A.
MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD, CASES AND TEXT MAIERiALs 34445 (1980).
169. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 1259, 1272 (1947).
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here, the context of, and approach to, the creativity differ. Sec-
tion A covered the views that portray courts as (1) lawmaking or
policymaking agencies equal to, or greater than, legislatures, or
(2) partners with legislatures in making law. Section B discussed
the legislative supremacy view and associated restrictions on the
judicial function in statutory interpretation. This section deals
with another less restrictive view of judicial creativity within the
context of legislative supremacy. Although the categories are
very general, neat categorization is difficult because of the many
different combinations of views.
Professor Max Radin once wrote that courts should take a
statesmanlike view of statutes.170 He maintained that the exer-
cise of this statesmanship could occur whenever legislative lan-
guage does not prevent the judiciary from displacing statutory
purposes.17 1 In this context, Radin's view does not differ signifi-
cantly from the view that the legislature sometimes delegates a
creative function to the courts.1 72 In that sense Radin harmo-
nizes with the advocates of limited judicial creativity within the
context of legislative supremacy. Radin, however, criticized the
view that courts merely implement legislative will and con-
tended that the "legislature has no authority that is in any way
higher than that of the administrative or judicial offi-
cials. . .. ,, 3Although Radin apparently discarded legislative
supremacy, he nevertheless clearly stated that the legislative
purpose is "binding" on the courts.' 4 According to Radin, the
courts should discover the legislative purpose "by reading the
words of the statute."1 75 In fact, Radin stated that courts "may
not reject the purpose, even if they do not find it to be good.'1 7 6
170. Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 411-12 (1942). Ra-
din also suggested that courts could discover the statute's purpose from its substantive
provisions, preamble, or legislative history. Id. at 423. Radin believed, however, that leg-
islative debates and reports are not controlling. Id. at 410-411.
171. Id. at 422.
172. See Coffman, supra note 127, at 62-63; Wellington and Albert, supra note 129,
at 1551.
173. Radin, supra note 170, at 405, 406. Later he stated: "The statute-making
body-we cannot say it too often-is no more sovereign than the many regulation- or
judgment-making bodies, and much less sovereign than the totality of the persons whom
statutes, regulations and judgments affect." Id. at 408.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 409.
176. Id. at 422.
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Although Radin's attack on legislative supremacy may merely
reflect the contemporary legal mood, his denial of legislative
supremacy allowed him to avoid the "statement that the court
must not legislate. ' 17 7 In addition, this denial also undermined
the view that courts implement legislative will, a notion which
Radin believed gave rise to disingenuousness and the fiction that
courts merely adhere to statutory language. Radin maintained
that the latter evil served as a device to frustrate "the essence of
the statute."178
Regardless of philosophical perspectives, most commenta-
tors recognize some creative role for the courts in analyzing stat-
utes. One may fully accept the principle of legislative supremacy
and still favor a substantial, yet limited, legislative role for the
courts. 179 Certainly some judicial creativity is inevitable when-
ever a court attempts to ascertain and apply the precise meaning
of words in a given situation.8" The legislature may even intend
for the courts to decide a policy question.181 More often, how-
ever, the legislature simply fails to forsee the particular problem
when it enacts the applicable statute.182 In addition, some judi-
cial creativity becomes unavoidable "where two or more statutes,
passed at different times and often the product of different po-
litical forces, bear upon an issue before the court."8s Judicial
creativity is also necessary under the view that the legislature
enacts broad policy while courts and administrative agencies
provide details. Professor Murphy, for example, has argued that
legislatures "simply are not equipped" to enact details, and any
legislative attempt to do so "often results in a failure to deal
with tough policy questions. 18 4 For these reasons, most com-
mentators recognize the courts' creative role in the interpreta-
tion and application of statutes. Still, a substantial number of
commentators, which probably represent the prevailing view,
177. See id.
178. Id. at 407.
179. See, e.g., Kernochan, supra note 119, at 345, 356. Kernochan apparently agreed
with Radin that (1) adherence to exact statutory language does not necessarily further
the legislative purpose, and that (2) courts should be candid in exercising their policy-
making function. Id. at 341, 357-58.
180. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 137, at 528.
181. See, e.g., Coffman, supra note 127, at 62; Frank, supra note 169, at 1267.
182. See, e.g., Wellington and Albert, supra note 129, at 1550.
183. Id. at 1551.
184. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1313.
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recognize a creative role that is limited to some degree.185
Defining the limits of judicial creativity in the interpreta-
tion of statutes poses a more difficult problem. In an article on
statutory construction, Professor Bishin concluded that judges
should legislate but that this legislative role should be limited.18
He stated that the limits were uncertain and that "the range of
legitimate judicial choice is great.1 8 7 He asserted that the judi-
cial task was not interpretation or law-finding, but one of law-
making.1 88 Professor Murphy also criticized judicial pretense in
purporting to follow legislative direction when the court is actu-
ally making policy and suggested that courts should be honest
about their creative role.18 9 Bishin concluded that "the judicial
task in the interpretation of statutes entails the same freedom
and the same limitations as do the problems of the Constitution
and of the Common Law."190
Because of Bishin's conclusions, one may conclude that any
discussion of Bishin belongs in section A. However, Bishin as-
sumes some limits on judicial creativity, 9 ' and he apparently
does not intend to suggest that a court should engage in an un-
fettered, creative process when the applicable statute clearly
mandates a particular result. 92 Perhaps one could say this about
185. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 247; Coffman, supra note 127, at 82-
84; Frank, supra note 169, at 1272; Kernochan, supra note 119, at 357; Radin, supra note
3, at 881; Traynor, supra note 107, at 2.
186. Bishin, supra note 3, at 1.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 2-3, 28-29.
189. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1317.
190. Bishin, supra note 3, at 29.
191. Id. at 1.
192. A close examination of the following two statements in Bishin's conclusion sug-
gests that he was probably considering only those cases where the statute's meaning was
not clear:
A conscious effort to avoid the illusory certainties which accompany the
fact-finding approach might therefore change the prevailing image of the inter-
preter's role from Law Finder to Law Maker, since it would be the latter part
which he would be playing most often.... Yet perhaps our commitment to
rationality requires a stronger, more far-reaching statement than the one at
which we have just arrived. Perhaps it must be said-though it pain the cau-
tious ear-that judges are always lawmakers when the meaning of a statute is
in doubt.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). Some may doubt whether Bishin admits
he is dealing with ambiguous statutes. This latter conclusion is suggested in his footnote
to the last statement, which states that courts rarely decide cases where the statute
clearly determines the issue. Id. n.112.
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other views discussed in section A; but, as previously mentioned,
the only essential difference between the views discussed in sec-
tion A and those discussed here is one of degree, or perhaps
emphasis.
The difference between Murphy and Bishin is best illus-
trated in the following statement by Murphy: "The relationship
of legislature and court cannot be solely one of command. In
large areas it must be one of delegation and the legislature
should be able to rely on the courts to use their good sense to
carry out the delegation in the light of unforseen circum-
stances."193 Without straining credulity, that statement seems to
describe the creative areas as equal to the courts' role in devel-
oping the common law.
Professor Kernochan articulates more clearly the need for
limits on judicial creativity. In discussing the situation of
"[w]hen the judge acts as legislator, making choices not deter-
mined by evidence of intent,"19 he stressed that the considera-
tions governing a decision are limited:
Yet even as we recognize the latitude for all these considera-
tions, we must stress again a point we have just noted-i.e.,
that law-making in the statutory setting must be harmonized
with the statutory framework and with a rational purpose at-
tributed to the statute. The leeway for the courts is confined.195
Yet shortly before this last-quoted statement Kernochan wrote:
The considerations beyond intent to be weighed in making this
effort we may label "policy" or "public policy." In weighing
policy, the court will be acting much as it would act in a com-
mon law case when there is no binding precedent. Thus, as in
such a case, its striving to reach a wise decision, to do justice,
should be informed, inter alia, by due regard for conse-
quences-i.e., the social advantage of one result as against
another.196
Coffman also attempted to formulate limits for judges who
are unable to find clear direction from legislative intent. He
listed factors such as "the general purposes and policies of the
193. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1317.
194. Kernochan, supra note 119, at 356-57.
195. Id. at 357.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
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act" 197 and stressed "a proper respect for the role of the legisla-
ture, which flows from the basic notion of self-government."'' 9
He concluded:
There is, to be sure, a certain vagueness in all this that
may dissatisfy the seeker of a simple, clear cut, easy-to-apply
rule of interpretation that would remove all our interpretative
difficulties by identifying unequivocally the aggregate of things
or persons to which a statute applies. But such a quest is
doomed to disappointment, for there is no method or proce-
dure which will entirely supplant subjective reason. Moreover,
where the legislature has not indicated its will, we would lose
more than we would gain if we were to trade the flexibility
needed by courts to enforce the reasonable expectations arising
out of a statute for a Procrustean rule of interpretation that
could produce only a wooden and mechanical justice.199
One answer may be that when a court exercises discretion,
the limits on judicial creativity will be similar to those present in
common-law development. Perhaps the best approach to limit-
ing judicial creativity is to stress the need for judicial self-re-
straint. The former Chief Justice of California, Roger Traynor,
followed this approach.200
Another approach to limiting judicial creativity involves
narrowing the area within which judges could exercise creativity
in statutory interpretation. 20 1 Although this approach may signal
197. Coffman, supra note 127, at 82. Coffman also mentions "the words of the stat-
ute" and "the consequences of choosing one interpretation over another." The last state-
ment, of course, resembles Kernochan's description likening the court's task to its com-
mon-law function.
198. Id. at 83.
199. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).
200. Traynor, supra note 107, at 12-13. Traynor illustrated the idea as follows:
As one who has declared himself against rote readings of the law, I now
voice a comparable warning against zealous incantations that could be no less
ritualistic. Applause for a judge who throws chaos to the winds should not be
interpreted as encouragement likewise to abandon caution. A judge will remain
cautious if he remembers that his decisions, even though less than stone tab-
lets, are nonetheless resistant to easy liquidation or revision. Fortunately, he is
not likely to fancy himself raising hell as a benevolent dictator. If he keeps his
own identity in mind, neither will he risk becoming the dictator's nearest kin, a
benevolent savior with a capacity for raising holy hell.
Id. at 13.
201. See, e.g., R. DicKERSON, supra note 4, at 247. Dickerson states: "Only if there is
no guidance, by interpolation, extrapolation, or otherwise, from the rest of the legal or-
der, including the officially expressed views of the legislature, is the court justified in
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an uneasiness with judicial policymaking, it nevertheless reduces
only the frequency of instances involving judicial policymaking,
rather than actually confining the scope of that creativity when
exercised.
The idea of limited judicial creativity in statutory interpre-
tation reflects the conflict between a desire for reasoned deci-
sions and a desire for democratic responsibility. Certainly the
judiciary should implement legislative policy within the frame-
work of legislative supremacy because the legislature more accu-
rately reflects the will of the people. On the other hand, a court
must exercise discretion where legislative policy, as expressed
through the applicable statute, does not mandate any particular
decision in a given case. Because in this situation the court is
not legislatively confined, the court must act as it would with
the common law. This interpretive function poses no problem
for those who view the judiciary, and not the legislature, as bet-
ter able to create a rational system of law. But for those who
place a high value on legislative supremacy and statutory inter-
pretation designed to implement legislative will, the courts' obli-
gation to decide cases, despite statutory ambiguity or lack of ad-
equate legislative guidance, poses a difficult problem.0 2
Nevertheless, the tendency is to admit that courts do play this
creative role in interpreting statutes.
To contrast the creative role in statutory interpretation
with the idea of statutory analogy discussed in section A, some
might say the difference is between the grudging acceptance of a
necessary, albeit questionable, role, and the positive advocacy of
judicial creativity in the belief that courts will weave a better
fabric of law than that created by the legislatures. The limited
acceptance of the judicial role described in this section also con-
trasts with the views discussed in section B. There, the emphasis
on legislative supremacy leads to sincere attempts to stifle any
judicial creativity in interpreting statutes.
This Article has described these three approaches to
demonstrate how they coexist in American jurisprudence. Of
going it wholly on its own."
202. A court could react by "remanding" the matter to Congress for a decision on
the unresolved issue. See Bickel and Wellington, supra note 86, at 34-35, 39. However,
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course, one could classify these approaches differently, or per-
haps add more categories. For the purposes of this Article, how-
ever, the three classifications used here should be sufficient.
Under the first view, courts are. crafters of the law; a judiciary
that is learned and skilled in creating a harmonious system of
rules to govern society. Alternately, the legislature is viewed as
supreme and, whether skilled or not, the branch best able to
make rules to govern society because of its relationship to the
people. Under this second view, the courts' task is confined to
the strict application of legislative language. Under the final
view, the legislature is supreme (to a greater or lesser extent de-
pending upon one's philosophy), but courts may properly exer-
cise their own creative ability in applying and interpreting stat-
utes. These three views may influence or justify judicial behavior
in any particular case.
D. Judicial Creativity in Particular Cases
To appreciate the full scope of assertions about whether a
court should make policy in areas governed by statutes, one
must focus on the policy decisions which may be involved. Ac-
cordingly, this section will consider several cases which analyze
the relationship between the judicial and legislative roles.
Shortly before Congress enacted the Endangered Species
Act of 1973,203 scientists discovered the snail darter. This new
species of fish lived in a habitat which would be destroyed if the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) completed the Tellico
Dam.20' Before the dam began operation, however, the snail
darter was declared an "endangered species," a declaration
which prohibited the TVA from destroying the snail darter's
habitat.
20 5
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,200 the Supreme
Court held that section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973207 required issuance of an injunction to prevent TVA from
operating the dam .20 The Court affirmed the injunction despite
203. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1976 & Supp. mI 1979).
204. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158-59, 162 (1978).
205. See id. at 161-62; 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
206. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
207. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
208. 437 U.S. at 189-95.
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a district court finding that Congress had appropriated money
for the dam's construction with full knowledge of the snail
darter problem.20 9
Referring to section 7's requirement that federal agencies
should not by their actions destroy endangered species or their
habitats, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, said: "One
would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
were any plainer than those in [section] 7 of the Endangered
Species Act.... This language admits of no exception."2 10 The
Court found that the Act's language, as well as its legislative his-
tory,2 1 "indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endan-
gered species to be afforded the highest of priorities. "212
TVA argued that "the Endangered Species Act cannot rea-
sonably be interpreted as applying to a federal project which
was well under way when" it was enacted.2 13 The TVA further
asserted that abandonment of the Tellico Project would result in
a 53 million dollar lOSS. 2 1 4 Finally, it argued that approximately
85 to 90 species of darters lived in Tennessee, where the dam
was located, and that new species were discovered at the rate of
one a year.21 5 Given these facts, the Court could have concluded
that the Act should not apply to a project that was substantially
completed before the Act became effective.216
209. Id. at 166. "Congress has appropriated monies for Tellico every year since
1967. . . ." Id. at 158. "In 1975, 1976 and 1977, Congress, with full knowledge of the
Tellico Project's effect on the snail darter and the alleged violation of the Endangered
Species Act, continued to appropriate money for the completion of the Project." Id. at
200 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court concluded that Congress did not impliedly repeal
§ 7 by continuing appropriations for the Tellico Dam. Id. at 189-93.
210. Id. at 173.
211. See id. at 174-88.
212. Id. at 174.
213. Id. at 173.
214. Id. at 166.
215. Id. at 159 n.7. During Senate debate on an amendment to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act after Hill was decided, a Congressional Research Service memorandum, On Spe-
cies and Community Evolution: The Only Constant is Change, was entered in the Re-
cord. 124 CONG. REC. S10901-03 (daily ed. July 17, 1978). One statement from that
memorandum helps place this problem in perspective: "[E]xtinction is a part of the dy-
namic and continuing relationship between life forms and environment,. ., change in
habitats and in floral and faunal associations is the expected norm over time, and...
just as the biological communities we now see are not the same as were found hundreds,
or thousands, or millions of years ago, so too will future associations of plants and animal
species differ from those today." Id. at S10903.
216. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Court's decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
may represent a commitment to protect all species and an effort
to reverse the trend of wildlife destruction from human inatten-
tion. On the other hand, the dissenting position may indicate a
reluctance to extend congressional policy to an extreme position,
especially when the Court could have drafted a decision to affect
only projects in progress when the Act became effective. Argua-
bly, a rigid judicial interpretation could have generated support
for the Act's repeal.217
Parallel contrasting views emerge from a process stand-
point. Certainly courts must adhere to Congressional policy as
expressed in the statutory language. Courts should also, how-
ever, exercise discretion in their application of statutory lan-
guage. Accordingly, the Court might have reached a result more
consistent with the overall legislative purpose by applying the
statutory language only to the extent the language is consistent
with sound policy. Thus, Justice Powell's dissenting opinion re-
lied on Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States2 '8 in argu-
ing that the Court should not apply a statute's language if the
result would violate the legislative intention.219 In discussing the
Court's policy role, Justice Powell remarked:
It is not our province to rectify policy or political judgments by
the Legislative Branch, however egregiously they may disserve
the public interest. But where the statutory language and legis-
lative history, as in this case, need not be construed to reach
such a result, I view it as the duty of this Court to adopt a
permissible construction that accords with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal.
220
The Chief Justice's majority opinion presented the opposite
view and held that once Congress has established priorities, as in
this case, courts must adhere to that policy decision.221 Answer-
217. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun, who might fairly be called a conservationist,
see, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S.
669, 699 (1973)(Blackmun, J., concurring); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755
(1972)(Blackmun, J., dissenting), joined Justice Powell's dissenting opinion. 437 U.S. at
195.
218. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
219. 437 U.S. at 204-05.
220. Id. at 196.
221. 437 U.S. at 194. The Chief Justice's statement of the Court's proper role con-
tains the following propositions:
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ing Justice Powell, he concluded: "We agree with the Court of
Appeals that in our constitutional system the commitment to
the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches. '222 Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Powell expressed concern that the Court's decision would
adversely affect an economically depressed area and threaten
many important federal projects. 223 In his view, the proper pol-
icy was so clear that Congress would amend the Act to avoid the
"grave consequences made possible by the decision."'224 Powell
concluded that he "had not thought it to be the province of this
Court to force Congress into otherwise unnecessary action by in-
terpreting a statute to produce a result no one intended. '225
Whether the Court or the dissenters are correct on the issue
of the proper judicial role is difficult to determine. An overly
rigid application of statutory language could prevent Congress
from enacting a policy without generating undue criticism. On
the other hand, permitting courts to entertain arguments that
application of a statutory provision in a particular situation un-
dermines the national interest could also frustrate Congressional
will.
In any case, whether one accepts or denies a creative judi-
cial function determines the emphasis placed on judicial defer-
Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priori-
ties in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought...
Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that
the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the high-
est of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as "institutional-
ized caution."
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course
consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of inter-
preting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its con-
stitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.
Id.
222. Id. at 195.
223. Id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 210.
225. Id. at 210-11. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion stated that a court could
refuse to issue an injunction on the basis of equitable considerations, and that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue an injunction. Id. at 211-13.
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ence to the legislature's role in creating public policy. Accept-
ance or denial alone, however, may not be an effective guide for
deciding when a court should defer to the legislature. If the leg-
islature has enacted language that yields a bad result,226 should
a court correct the error as a helpful partner, or should the court
defer to the legislature to correct the error?
Whether a court should defer to the legislature when the
statute, if applied, would yield a bad result is best illustrated by
the following hypothetical: A statute prohibits dogs in the park
and places responsibility for any violation on the person in
charge of the dog. The statute contains no exceptions. Assume
that a blind person strolls through the park with a seeing-eye
dog. The blind person is prosecuted for violating the statute.
Should the court convict the blind man because the statute
mandates conviction and the legislature alone can correct errors
in statutory schemes? What is gained from enforcement? Of
course, a weak possibility exists that the legislative policy in-
tended that no dogs be allowed in the park, but this is unlikely.
If the court believes it should ignore countervailing consid-
erations once the legislature has established priorities, then the
court would probably reach an unseemly result by strictly apply-
ing the statute. This result, however, may be appropriate in a
case where great political controversy surrounds the legislative
decision establishing the priorities. When the community pos-
sesses strong feelings on an issue, a prudent court should "re-
mand" the controversy to the legislature.227 Articulating a stan-
dard for deciding when to exercise judicial deference then
becomes the problem.228
The statements of the Chief Justice and Justice Powell
quoted above illustrate that when a court exercises discretion in
deciding when it should defer to the legislature, the court tends
to justify its conclusion with categorical statements about the
proper judicial role. These statements do little to explain the de-
cision, and the court's other reasons often rest on the facts in
226. It is easier to discuss judicial deference in the context of an assumed bad result.
227. Bickel and Wellington, supra note 86, at 34-35, 38-39; Wellington and Albert,
supra note 129, at 1565-66. Bickel and Wellington believe that a court should use the
remanding function only in a very limited category of cases. Supra note 86, at 39.
228. For example, Wellington and Albert have found that the category of cases in
which courts should exercise deference in deciding politically charged issues "resist[ed]
precise definition." Supra note 129, at 1563.
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the particular case. In short, no guiding standard exists. Instead,
the conflicting views on the proper judicial function are
presented as conclusory statements designed to demonstrate the
error of the other side's position. Since American jurisprudence
contains conflicting, but respectable authority on the exercise of
creative judicial policy-making, courts may act either as creative
partners with the legislatures, or refuse to do so because a crea-
tive role would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Fur-
thermore, any discussion of whether a court was correct on the
issue of deference is futile because no generally accepted stan-
dard exists.
Following Hill, Congress amended the Endangered Species
Act to permit exemption through administrative procedure.229
Although that legislation does not determine the statute's earlier
meaning, it may indicate the original Congressional policy.2 30
Nevertheless, two views of Hill exist which are consistent with
the limited exemption enactment. In explaining the proposed
exemption procedure, Senator Culver discussed the Hill case:
"Strictly speaking, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Hill against the Tennessee Valley Authority was a good
one, in that it correctly interpreted the purposes of the law and
the intent of Congress, which was to give priority to the impor-
tant value of endangered species. ' 231 Senator Baker, however,
asserted the opposite view of Hill:
The court's decision interpreted section 7 of the act such that
this multipurpose water project, which is over 90 percent com-
229. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat.
3752-60 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1981)). The criteria for granting
the exemption are set forth at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The Committee
that can grant the exemption is comprised of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary
of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of
EPA, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration, and one individual from each affected state. Id. § 1536(e)(3). An
exemption requires the affirmative votes of at least five members voting in person. Id. §
1536(h)(1), and representatives may not be considered part of the required quorum of
five for the purposes of a vote. Id. § 1536(e)(5)(A). Any person may obtain judicial review
of the Committee's decision. Id. § 1536(n); Id. § 1532(13)(person defined). The procedure
appears to make obtaining an exemption difficult.
230. "Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to
great weight in statutory construction." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
380-81 (1969). Accord, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
231. 124 CONG. REc. 21132 (1978). Senator Scott maintained a similar view, but he
stressed the separation of powers doctrine.
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plete, must be stopped if the snail darter or its critical habitat
were to be harmed. Mr. President, I feel that this is certainly
not what Congress intended and hope that our efforts here to-
day will result in a clear mandate that other national impor-
tant interests must be balanced within the decisionmaking pro-
cess in the act.
232
Senator Culver assured the Senate that the committee had
carefully considered the exemption proposal. In his view, the
proposal would "preserve the integrity of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act" and inject "the flexibility which will be needed in the
coming years. '233 The Senate rejected an exemption for the Tel-
lico Dam and all other projects which were started before the
Act took effect,234 but Congress later authorized the construction
and operation of the Tellico dam.235
Although the Court probably interpreted the Act's language
more rigidly than Congress intended, it is difficult to determine
whether the Court could have reached a reasonable result in ju-
dicial terms without departing from congressional policy. Justice
Powell would have allowed construction of the Tellico Dam to
continue by interpreting the legislation prospectively only,23 6 a
result which Congress later rejected.3 7 Furthermore, Justice
Powell's solution might have undermined Congressional policy
by allowing a large number of projects, begun before the stat-
ute's enactment, to continue notwithstanding possible environ-
mental damage.
When Congress acts expeditiously, as it did here, political
resolution may be comparable to judicial resolution. Unfortu-
nately, in many cases Congress may not act. The rigid applica-
tion of the language in Hill may have forced Congressional ac-
tion, whereas the opposite decision may not have produced that
effect. If so, then perhaps the question of the Tellico Dam con-
struction and the Endangered Species Act's application involves
232. Id. at 21138. At this point Senator Baker was referring to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeal's decision in Hill.
233. Id. at 21132.
234. Id. at 21335.
235. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69,
93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979).
236. 437 U.S. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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the kinds of issues that the Court should avoid deciding.238
Under this view, a court must first determine whether a particu-
lar decision is likely to stimulate political action and then decide
whether the issue is one more appropriate for legislative resolu-
tion. Of course, even if legislative action is unlikely in some
cases, a court might conclude that only the democratic body
should make the decision. Although this analysis is probably
better than a rigid application of the separation of powers doc-
trine, it still falls short of producing any clear guideline.
Devising a method by which a court can exempt only one
project from a statute's reach is difficult. Congress, on the other
hand, can easily exempt projects, as it did with the Tellico Dam.
Thus, one distinction between judicial and legislative powers is
that courts must render well-reasoned decisions to serve as
precedents, while Congress can act in a particular case without
harmonizing the result with those in similar cases. 239
Another case which illustrates judicial creativity in statu-
tory interpretation and application is United Steelworkers v.
Weber.24° In Weber, the Supreme Court applied the rule of
Church of the Holy Trinity241 that the Court will not follow a
statute's language if the result would violate the "spirit" of the
statute or "the intention of its makers. '242
Weber involved an affirmative action program under which
a private employer, in agreement with the union, established a
training program to teach workers the skills required to become
craftworkers.24 3 The employer agreed to reserve fifty percent of
the places in the training program for blacks until a certain
number of blacks entered the crafts.244 Blacks with less seniority
238. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
239. The prohibition in many states against special legislation may prevent state
legislators from acting in individual cases with the same freedom as Congress exhibits.
See, e.g., J. DAViES, supra note 125, at 179; H. READ, supra note 125, at 543-47. See also,
e.g., ALA. CONST. art. II, § 19; CAL. CONsT. art. 4, § 25; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 13; N.Y.
CONsT. art. 3, § 17; VA. CONsT. art. IV, § 14; Wis. CONsT. art. IV, § 30.
240. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For another analysis of the decision, see Dworkin, How to
Read the Civil Rights Act, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BooKs, December 20, 1979, at 37,
col. 1.
241. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
242. 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
at 459).
243. 443 U.S. at 198.
244. Id. at 198-99.
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than Weber were selected for training.245 Weber brought a class
action suit charging that he and other similarly situated whites
were the victims of discrimination prohibited by sections 703(a)
and (d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964.246 Those
sections prohibit discrimination "against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race,"24 and discrimina-
tion "in admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
'248
Justice Brennan's majority opinion 249 framed the issue as
"whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that
accord racial preferences. '250 His opinion stressed the plan's vol-
untary nature and its purpose to "eliminate traditional patterns
of racial segregation. '25 1 Justice Rehnquist's dissent disputed
the Court's finding that the plan was voluntarily adopted and
instead concluded that the plan was adopted under pressure
from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.252 The Court
acknowledged the argument that the plan arguably violated Ti-
tle VII because it discriminated "against white employees solely
because they are white," but cited Church of the Holy Trinity
for the proposition that the prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation must "be read against the background of the legislative
history of Title VII and the historical context from which the
Act arose. ' 25 3 Viewing the issue from this perspective, the Court
concluded that an "[e]xamination of those sources makes clear
that an interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-con-
scious affirmative action would 'bring about an end completely
245. Id. at 199. The blacks selected also had less seniority than some whites who
were rejected. Id.
246. Id. at 199-200; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a),
(d) (1976).
247. Id. § 703(a).
248. Id. § 703(d).
249. Justices Powell and Stevens did not take part in the decision. Justice Black-
mun joined the Court's opinion and also wrote a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Bur-
ger dissented, writing his own opinion and joining the dissenting opinion of Justice
Rehnquist.
250. 443 U.S. at 200 (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at 201.
252. Id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 201.
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at variance with the purpose of the statute' and must be
rejected.
2 54
Justice Rehnquist's dissent cited legislative history indicat-
ing that Title VII mandated race-neutral personnel decisions.255
In a separate, dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized his view of the Court's proper role:
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for
were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amend-
ment of Title VII. I cannot join the Court's judgment, however,
because it is contrary to the explicit language of the statute
and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-estab-
lished principles of separation of powers. Under the guise of
statutory "construction," the Court effectively rewrites Title
VII to achieve what it regards as a desirable result. It
"amends" the statute to do precisely what both its sponsors
and its opponents agreed the statute was not intended to do.258
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion,257 but he also
wrote a separate, concurring opinion. Although Blackmun
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's presentation of the legislative
history, he "believe[d] that additional considerations, practical
and equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the
88th Congress, support the conclusion reached by the Court. '258
He concluded that "if the Court has misperceived the political
254. Id. at 201-02 (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319
(1953)).
255. Id. at 230-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For example, in presenting evidence of
what Congress intended prohibited discrimination to mean, Justice Rehnquist quoted
Senator Humphrey's response to the opponents' charge that the bill would give the Com-
mission or a court power to require employers to hire, fire or promote to achieve a cer-
tain racial balance: "That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexis-
tent. In fact, the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination." Id. at 238
(quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964))(emphasis added by Justice Rehnquist). Justice
Rehnquist also quoted from a joint interpretative memorandum submitted by Senators
Clark and Case on the same point:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial
balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain
a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of
Title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to
hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that dis-
crimination is prohibited as to any individual.
Id. at 239 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964)).
256. 443 U.S. at 216 (emphasis in original)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
257. The decision was 5-2 with two justices not participating. See supra note 249.
258. 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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will, it has the assurance that because the question is statutory
Congress may set a different course if it so chooses."2 9
Rather than focusing on the meaning of the language
prohibiting racial discrimination, as Justice Rehnquist did, the
Court approached the statute from a purpose-oriented perspec-
tive. The Court cited appropriate supporting references to the
legislative history and found that the purpose of Title VII was to
ensure that blacks obtained jobs.6 0 In light of this purpose, the
Court reasoned that the language prohibiting discrimination in
employment "cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition
against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
efforts to hasten the elimination of. . .vestiges [of discrmina-
tion against blacks]. '2 1 The Court supported its conclusion with
the following reasoning:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's con-
cern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve
the lot of those who had "been excluded from the American
dream for so long,". . . constituted the first legislative prohi-
bition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.
26 2
259. Id. at 216. But see Dworkin, supra note 240, at 37, col. 2:
In the present circumstances, however, a Supreme Court decision on the
statutory legality of affirmative action programs is, as a practical matter, al-
most as irreversible as a decision on their constitutional validity. It seems un-
likely that Congress would now pass legislation either explicitly condoning or
explicitly forbidding affirmative action in employment, at least so long as that
issue remains politically volatile as it is now. So the Court's decision about the
legal consequences of what Congress has already done is likely to remain in
force for some time, whatever that decision is.
260. 443 U.S. at 202-03. The Court quoted from a House Report for the proposition
that "Congress did not intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action
efforts as one method of solving this problem." Id. at 203. The quoted language is:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and conse-
quences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is
reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment
of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create
an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of
discrimination.
Id. at 203-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, pt. 1 (1963))(emphasis
by the Court). While that language states that private action is possible to eliminate
discrimination not prohibited by the Civil Rights Act, the language does not indicate
whether the Act prohibits private, race-conscious, affirmative action.
261. 443 U.S. at 204.
262. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
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Although the Court did not clearly distinguish between per-
missible and prohibited affirmative action,26 3 it did state that
the Weber plan fell within "the area of discretion left by Title
VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action
plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories." 264 The Court also failed to
explain why it described the areas in which affirmative action
plans could be implemented as "traditionally segregated job cat-
egories. ' 26 5 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, argued
vigorously that the Court should have used a narrower category:
that affirmative action is permissible in job areas where the em-
ployer's past conduct amounts to an arguable violation of Title
VII.266
Under one view of Weber, the Court perceived affirmative
action as fulfilling the ultimate congressional purpose: integrat-
ing blacks into the economy by providing jobs for them in indus-
tries where previous discrimination had deprived them of job
opportunities. The next step is to argue that Congress did not
focus on details when it drafted the statute. Thus, unless the
Court construed the statute's prohibited discrimination to ex-
clude this private, race-conscious discrimination, the statutory
language would frustrate the Congressional will. A realist might
argue that the Court is really making the policy,26 7 but argu-
ments based upon a generalized dislike of judicial creativity cer-
tainly carry little weight with those who admit (or advocate)
that courts should exercise some creative policymaking in statu-
tory interpretation.
The substantive issue in Weber was probably the Court's
motivating concern.268 In contrast, the notion that courts should
263. 443 U.S. at 208.
264. Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
265. The Court noted that a court could take judicial notice of exclusion from crafts
on racial grounds. Id. at 198 n.1.
266. Id. at 211-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The different approaches apparently
stem from the different justifications offered for the result. Compare the Court's justifi-
cation, id. at 204, and the arguments that it does not consider, id. at 209 n.9, with Justice
Blackmun's reasoning. Id. at 209-11.
267. Rehnquist makes that argument in the form of an accusation. Id. at 254 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
268. Dworkin seems to suggest that Weber could be decided only on the basis of
political morality:
I see no procedure for decision-no theory of legislation-other than this:
1984]
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refrain from making policy motivated the dissenters to express
their view. 269 The dissenters' view would be more acceptable if it
were articulated in less than an absolute proscription. One might
question, for example, whether the Court has the ability to
choose convincingly between allowing an exception for affirma-
tive action "in traditionally segregated job categories," 270 or an
exception only where the employer may have committed an "ar-
guable violation"27 1 of the statute. Rather than dividing on judi-
cial creativity in interpreting statutes, the Court should carefully
consider the problems that the issue raises. Courts should ap-
proach judicial creativity by considering those factors that coun-
sel the exercise of judicial deference and self-restraint.
The Supreme Court may have considered the factors that
counsel judicial deference and self-restraint in deciding Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman 27 1 In Pen-
nhurst, the Court held that the congressional findings contained
in section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, that treatment for the developmentally dis-
abled "should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive
of the person's personal liberty,2 73 did not create enforceable
one justification for a statute is better than another, and provides the direction
for coherent development of the statute, if it provides a more accurate or more
sensitive or sounder analysis of the underlying moral principles. So judges
must decide which of the two competing justifications is superior as a matter of
political morality, and apply the statute so as to further that justification. Dif-
ferent judges, who disagree about morality, will therefore disagree about the
statute. But that is inevitable, and if each judge faces the moral decision
openly, an informed public will be in a better position to understand and criti-
cize them than if the moral grounds of decision lie hidden under confused ar-
guments about nonexistent legislative intents.
Dworkin, supra note 240, at 41, col. 2.
269. Chief Justice Burger conceded that, as a matter of personal preference, he
agreed with the Court's substantive result. 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 209.
271. Id. at 212-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
272. 451 U.S. 1 (1981), revug and remanding 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979)(en banc).
On remand, the lower courts again reached the same result, but on other grounds. Once
again, the Supreme Court granted certiori and reversed. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 52 U.S.L.W. 4155 (U.S., Jan. 23, 1984). For a practitioner's viewpoint on
Pennhurst written for lawyers representing state and local governments, see Baker,
Making the Most of Pennhurst's "Clear Statement" Rule, 31 CATH. UNIV. L. REv. 439
(1982).
273. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010
(1976).
50
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss2/2
LIMITS ON JUDICIAL CREATIVITY
rights and obligations .1 4 The Court reached this conclusion even
though section 6010 began, "Congress makes the following find-
ings respecting the rights of persons with developmental disabil-
ities. 21 7 5 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded:
[Section] 6010, when read in the context of other more specific
provisions of the Act, does no more than express a congres-
sional preference for certain kinds of treatment. It is simply a
general statement of "findings" and, as such, is too thin a reed
to support the rights and obligations read into it by the court
below.2 7
6
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, asserted that section 6010 "clearly states
rights which the developmentally disabled are to be provided as
against a participating State. '277 Like the majority, Justice




Under one view, the Court faced whether to mandate treat-
ment in the least restrictive environment, as the court of appeals
did.27 9 Some might call that process statutory interpretation;
others might view it as judicial creativity. 280 Declining to create
enforceable rights in this case, the Court emphasized that the
statute in question implemented the Congressional spending
power. Consequently, Congress must speak more clearly before
the Court will find an enforceable right.2 l This insistence on
clarity stems from the Court's sensitivity to the contractual na-
ture of obligations that a state undertakes when it accepts
money from the federal government. This clarity requirement
enables "the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant
of the consequences of their participation. '2 2
274. 451 U.S. at 15-27.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976)(emphasis added).
276. 451 U.S. at 19.
277. Id. at 40 (White, J., dissenting in part).
278. Id.
279. 612 F.2d 84, 107, 116 (3rd Cir. 1979)(en banc). Even if the Supreme Court
found that the statute created substantive rights, this conclusion would not have re-
quired the Supreme Court to accept the lower courts' grant of relief. 451 U.S. at 53-54
(White, J., dissenting in part).
280. Neither the Court's nor the dissenters' interpretation is clearly correct. Com-
pare 451 U.S. 15-27 with id. at 36-47 (White, J., dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 16-17.
282. Id. at 17.
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In construing section 6010, the Court compared the small
amount of federal funding involved with the resulting financial
burden if the states were required to provide 'appropriate'
treatment in the 'least restrictive' setting.12 s3 The Court also
noted the indeterminate nature of those obligations2"4 and con-
cluded that "[i]t defies common sense, in short, to suppose that
Congress implicitly imposed this massive obligation on partici-
pating States."285 The Court then supported its conclusion with
"the rule of statutory construction . . . that Congress must ex-
press clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of fed-
eral funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or
not to accept those funds."28
The Court's holding in Pennhurst speaks of statutory con-
struction. If, however, the Court could have interpreted the stat-
ute to impose an obligation, then perhaps the Court was really
refraining from imposing the obligation through the use of judi-
cial creativity. If so, the Court actually limited its creative func-
tion in dealing with statutes. Such behavior in this case reflects
sympathetic concern for states' rights2 7 and emphasizes that the
articulation of limits at the level of process often serves as a tool
to implement substantive goals.
One of the concerns in Pennhurst was defining appropriate
treatment in the least restrictive setting. Whether a court pos-
sesses the requisite ability to define these terms is questionable.
Although the conditions at Pennhurst appeared sufficiently egre-
gious to obviate doubt,288 the court of appeals found that the
283. Id. at 24.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. (emphasis added). This rule surfaced again in a footnote to an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Rehnquist. Board of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982).
287. The dissenters were also concerned with states' rights. On the issue of the ap-
propriate remedy, Justice White's opinion emphasized that the state should have an op-
portunity to decide whether to abandon federal funding and not comply with the judi-
cially mandated requirements derived from the funding legislation. 451 U.S. at 53-54
(White, J., dissenting in part). Viewed as a states' rights case, Pennhurst could represent
application of the constitutionally based federalism concerns to impose special require-
ments on Congress when it acts with respect to the states.
288. According to the court of appeals, the district court found that Pennhurst resi-
dents lacked adequate treatment and that the Pennhurst environment posed a hazard to
its residents. 612 F.2d at 93. The appellate court noted the shocking nature of the case:
[T]he Pennhurst environment was found to be unsanitary. There is often urine
and excrement on the ward floors. Infectious diseases are common. Obnoxious
[Vol. 35
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concept lacked definition with respect to individual patients. so
Chief Judge Seitz's comment that "the record presents a
mass of social science and medical data from which judges are
asked to fashion legal rules" is perhaps even more indicative of
the problem.290 Ultimately, the Supreme Court left open the
possibility of relief under provisions other than section 6010 and
remanded the case.291 Critics of the Court's section 6010 holding
should be cautious in denouncing the Court's failure to uphold a
creative judicial role in enunciating rights under legislative
acts.292 Proper care for retarded citizens undeniably deserves
support. On the other hand, consideration of the proper judicial
role requires separate treatment for the relative values of proper
care for reiarded citizens and judicial creativity. One might well
conclude that particular needs of society justify straining judi-
cial creative ability. Judicial judgments, however, should be
made in the light of institutional considerations which, if ne-
glected, might weaken the courts' ability to serve the citizens.
Thus, it is questionable whether a court could, at legislative re-
quest, define appropriate treatment. The limits Pennhurst
places on judicial creativity deserve serious consideration and
should not be neglected.
Another example of the tension between judicial creativity
and judicial restraint in statutory interpretation is Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver.2 e5 In Mohasco, the Supreme Court considered
two interpretations of the limitations provisions of Title VII of
odors and excessive noise permeate the institution. Most toilet areas do not
have towels, soap or toilet paper. Injuries to residents by other residents or
through self-abuse are common. Serious injuries inflicted by staff members, in-
cluding sexual assaults, have occurred. Physical restraints, which may be phys-
ically harmful and which have caused injuries and at least one death, are re-
sorted to more frequently than appropriate because of shortages of staff.
Dangerous psychotropic drugs are used for purposes of behavior control and
staff convenience, rather than for legitimate treatment needs.
Id.
289. Id. at 114-15. "The right to the least restrictive environment also supports an
individualized approach." Id. The court of appeals concluded that neither the statute
nor the Constitution precludes institutionalization of some patients. Id.
290. Id. at 117 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
291. 451 U.S. at 27-31.
292. The constitutional issues involved in Pennhurst are beyond the scope of this
Article.
293. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
1984] 243
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.94 The Court refused to choose the
interpretation that would have upheld the timeliness of the
charge filed in the case. Mohasco has been criticized as produc-
ing unfair results29 5 and as representating a new Supreme Court
trend of strictly construing statutory language.96
Under Title VII, a complainant must file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within
180 days after the unfair employment practice occurs. If, how-
ever, a state or local agency may hear the charge, the limitations
period is extended to 300 days,297 and the complainant may not
file a charge with the EEOC until 60 days after it is filed with
the state or local agency.
298
In Mohasco, the EEOC received a charge on the 291st day
after the alleged discrimination occured.29 9 The charge was then
referred to a state agency responsible for monitoring such com-
plaints.300 Thus, the issue was whether the charge was properly
filed with the EEOC when the EEOC received it given the statu-
tory prohibition on filing with the EEOC until 60 days after the
charge is filed with the appropriate state agency.30' The Court
held that the filing was untimely because the state proceedings
had not terminated before the 300-day period elapsed and be-
cause the 60-day filing prohibition applied beyond the 300th
day.3 0 2 The Court declined to hold that the charge was filed on
the 291st day but could not be processed for 60 days thereaf-
ter.30 3 While the latter interpretation might have strained the
literal words of the 60-day prohibition, such an interpretation
would have furthered the elimination of unfair employment
practices. 0 4
Justice Steven's majority opinion viewed the particular pro-
294. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(c), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (e) (1976).
295. Note, supra note 31, at 906.
296. Id. at 895.
297. § 706(e).
298. § 706(c). See 447 U.S. at 812. Section 706(c) contains an exception for cases
where proceedings are terminated before the 60-day period expires.
299. 447 U.S. at 810.
300. Id.
301. See id. at 817. Under Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the EEOC may
file the charge with the state agency.
302. 447 U.S. at 817.
303. Id. at 828-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. See id. at 818.
244 [Vol. 35
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visions as the result of a compromise0s and noted that "time
limitations are inevitably arbitrary to some extent."30 6 He sug-
gested that even if an interpretation that upheld the filing as
timely might serve the interests of justice "in this particular case
. .. , experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of
evenhanded administration of the law.
'30 7
Although some commentators have criticized Mohasco as
one in a series of cases limiting regulation,30 8 Justice Stevens'
characterization of Mohasco is noteworthy: a case in which Con-
gress has set a short limitations period.30 9 Courts are well-ad-
vised to avoid judicial creativity in applying statutes that are ar-
bitrary in nature. It is difficult to write a reasoned opinion that
justifies one limitations period over another.
The dissenters suggested that when two meanings are plau-
sible, "the plain meaning rule" should not prevent the examina-
tion of both meanings.310 This is especially true when interpret-
ing a remedial civil rights statute and the meaning neglected is
that which would permit enforcement. Still, the problems raised
by judicial creativity in interpreting statutory limitations peri-
ods deserve attention, especially when those periods are the re-
sult of congressional battles and compromise. Thus, Mohasco
demonstrates that following a stated limitations period, rather
than broadening it through judicial creativity, is the wiser judi-
cial course. Moreover, whether a particular substantive result
might counsel a court to risk the dangers inherent in exercising
judicial creativity in applying a limitations period is an ever pre-
sent question. Regardless of the answer to that question, the ex-
tension of a limitations period is not necessarily praiseworthy
when done through judicial creativity.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,31 discussed ear-
lier,3 12 is another example of judicial creativity. There, the Court
305. Id. at 818-19.
306. Id. at 818.
307. Id. at 826.
308. See Note, supra note 31, at 911.
309. 447 U.S. at 825-26.
310. Id. at 828 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
311. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
312. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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considered section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.-"' Section 301
grants federal courts jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining
agreements. The Court interpreted section 301 as a mandate for
federal courts to fashion substantive law from the policy of the
national labor laws.314 Justice Frankfurter's dissent noted that
the Court's decision imposed upon federal courts the difficult
task of performing this role without exceeding the confines of
judicial power.3 15 He questioned whether the Court was "justi-
fied in creating all the difficult problems of choice within a
sphere of delicate policy without any direction from Con-
gress."31 Although it is now well accepted that section 301
grants power to the federal courts "to develop a common law of
labor-management relations, ' 317 whether such a judicial role is
proper is still questionable. Shortly after that decision, Profes-
sors Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington questioned the
courts' ability to perform the task Lincoln Mills imposed upon
them.
318
By placing heavy emphasis on private settlement through
arbitration, however, the Court largely avoided many of the
problems associated with enforcement of collective bargaining
313. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
314. 353 U.S. at 456. In more specific terms, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
described the task as follows:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substan-
tive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations.
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory sanction but will
be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy
that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be de-
termined by the nature of the problem.
Id. at 457 (emphasis added). Justice Douglas based the grant of power not on the stat-
ute's language but on the conclusion that the legislation "expresse[d] a federal policy
that federal courts should enforce [collective bargaining] agreements on behalf of or
against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that
way." Id. at 455. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, pointed to "prickly and extensive
problems that the supposed grant would create" and concluded that "[w]isdom suggests
self-restraint in undertaking to solve these problems unless the Court is clearly directed
to do so." Id. at 464.
315. Id. at 464-65. Justice Frankfurter concluded that § 301 failed to confer federal
question jurisdiction on the federal courts. Id. at 484.
316. Id. at 478. Earlier, Justice Frankfurter noted the problems with fashioning fed-
eral common law to govern collective bargaining agreements. Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1955)(plu-
rality opinion).
317. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981)(dictum).
318. Bickel and Wellington, supra note 86, at 24-26.
246 [Vol. 35
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agreements. 319 In detailing the duties of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, Congress stated that the service should
offer its assistance only "as a last resort and in exceptional
cases. 3 20 This directive was prefaced: "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desira-
ble method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement. 3 21 Relying on that statement, the Court determined
that congressional policy favored private dispute settlement and
concluded that this policy could be "effectuated only if the
means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences
under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.
3 22
The Court reasoned that because labor arbitration served as
a substitute for industrial strife, rather than as a substitute for
litigation, judicial hostility towards arbitration had no place in
section 301 suits.323 After discussing the nature of the collective
bargaining agreement, 2' the Court described the functions of
the labor arbitrator and concluded that "[t]he ablest judge can-
not be expected to bring the same experience and competence to
bear upon the determination of a grievance .... "325 Thus, the
judicial task under section 301 became one of construing and en-
forcing arbitration agreements. When the particular case gives
rise to a question of whether a dispute was subject to arbitra-
tion, the courts should favor arbitration. 26
In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour,3 27 the Court held
that state courts deciding cases under section 301 must apply
federal law.328 The Court then concluded that a strike violates a
collective bargaining agreement when the underlying issue was
319. See the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
320. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)(1976).
321. Id.
322. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566.
323. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578.
324. Id. at 578-81.
325. Id. at 582.
326. Id. at 582-83.
327. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
328. Id. at 103-04. The Court had earlier held that § 301 did not deprive state courts
of jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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subject to compulsory arbitration.32 9 Thus, the Court found in
Lucas Flour an implied no-strike agreement. This decision fol-
lowed logically from the Court's announced policy of favoring ar-
bitration to settle labor disputes. 30
Enjoining a strike that violated an arbitration clause, how-
ever, gave the Court more difficulty. In Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,33" ' the Court considered whether section 301 super-
seded that section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act3 32 which bars
federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes. There,
the Court33 3 held that federal courts could not enjoin a strike
conducted in violation of a collective bargaining agreement that
provided for arbitration. Justice Black's majority opinion in Sin-
clair concluded that the enactment of section 301 did not im-
pliedly repeal the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. 334 The language of Justice Black's minority opinion
reflects a restrictive view of judicial policymaking. He suggested
that the result followed from "the plain import of a congres-
sional enactment, 3 3 5 and that Congress, not the Court, must de-
cide whether to modify the Norris-LaGuardia Act.38"
To the dissent, the issue in Sinclair required the Court to
accommodate the Taft-Hartley Act and the Norris-La Guardia
Act in a way "which will give the fullest possible effect to the
329. 369 U.S. at 105.
330. "Even more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with the
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute
for economic warfare." Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
332. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
333. Justice Frankfurter did not take part. Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan
joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
334. 370 U.S. at 203.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 214-15. Justice Black's opinion reflects his concern over the division of
power between the Court and Congress:
The question of what change, if any, should be made in the existing law is
one of legislative policy properly within the exclusive domain of Congress-it is
a question for lawmakers, not the law interpreters. Our task is the more lim-
ited one of interpreting the law as it now stands. In dealing with problems of
interpretation and application of federal statutes, we have no power to change
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central purposes of both. 3 3 7 Justice Brennan's dissenting opin-
ion concluded that the statutory language of the two Acts did
not require the Court's result. According to Justice Brennan, one
could easily infer that Congress intended for the courts to re-
solve the conflict between the two Acts.338 Nor did the dissent
share the majority's reluctance to engage in policymaking; in-
stead, the dissent stated that "[t]he Court . . should so exer-
cise its judgment as best to effect the most important purposes
of each statute. 3 3 9 In Justice Brennan's judgment, "the availa-
bility of the injunctive remedy in this setting is far more neces-
sary to the accomplishment of the purposes of section 301 than
it would be detrimental to those of Norris-LaGuardia. '340 Fur-
ther, the dissent noted that the federal courts' inability to grant
injunctive relief would create problems in cases which could also
be filed in the state courts.3 1 Perhaps more important was the
dissent's perception that the Court's decision "deals a crippling
blow to the cause of grievance arbitration itself.
'342
In Sinclair, the issue was the extent to which the Supreme
Court should make policy. The majority opinion, however, failed
to make policy. One critic has used Sinclair as the basis for his
conclusion that courts must deal with statutes just as they deal
with the Constitution and the common law. 43 Two other com-
mentators have sharply criticized the dissent's method of statu-
tory interpretation. 4 The theme of this latter criticism is that
the legislature must decide certain political issues, such as the
one in Sinclair.
3 45
337. Id. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 223-24.
339. Id. at 224.
340. Id. at 218.
341. Id. at 226-27. The dissent was concerned that suits for concerted activities in
breach of contract would hinder the development of a uniform federal contract law be-
cause these suits would be brought in state court to take advantage of the injunctive
relief available there. Also, the dissent was concerned that such factors as amenability to
process and locale would be determinative of the relief available, depending upon which
states have enacted anti-injunction statutes. Id.
342. Id. at 227.
343. Bishin, supra note 3, at 29.
344. Wellington and Albert, supra note 129, at 1549 passim.
345. Id. at 1565-66. Wellington and Albert raised two questions:
Should the Supreme Court undertake, the tasks of re-introducing the
strike injunction as a weapon available to the employer? Might it not be per-
suasively argued, because of the symbolic importance of the strike injunction
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In Sinclair, the Court avoided the need to confront the im-
plications of its decision by applying what Justice Black called
the mandated congressional policy while failing to decide the
policy issue. The Court also avoided the problem presented by
concurrent federal/state jurisdiction in section 301 suits. 46
Thus, although federal courts could not enjoin strikes that vio-
late arbitration clauses, state courts could.
3 47
Six years later in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,348 the
Supreme Court held that a defendant could remove a section
301 suit from state court to federal court. In other words, com-
bining Sinclair with the removal provision meant that a defend-
ant could avoid an injunction in a section 301 suit by removing
the suit from state court to federal court. 49 Then, two years af-
ter Avco, the Supreme Court350 overruled Sinclair in Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,351 declaring: "It is
in the politically sensitive area of labor-management relations, and because the
strike injunction has been once explicitly rejected by the political process, that
any change in its status should be made explicitly by Congress and the Presi-
dent; that, if there is to be change, Congress itself must confront the touchy
question squarely and speak unequivocally?
Id. (footnote omitted). They then considered Sinclair's effect on the arbitral process and
the infrequency with which Congress enacts major labor legislation as points detracting
from their argument. Id. at 1566. They concluded:
[T]he above arguments do not lessen, what is to our mind, the obligation of the
Court to keep clear the channels of policy making and the lines of responsibil-
ity in a democratic society. This obligation can be fulfilled only if the judicial
institutions confine their functions so as not to blur the distinction between
interstitial lawmaking and dealing with the gristle of the body politic. Certain
issues should be faced squarely by the legislatures, and rules of statutory inter-
pretation are, among other things, instruments for inducing such confrontation
and instruments for the protection of the people from the courts and the
courts from the people.
Id.
346. 370 U.S. at 226-27. See supra note 341.
347. 370 U.S. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Court had earlier held that state courts retained juris-
diction over § 301 suits.
349. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 244-45
(1970).
350. Justices Black and White dissented. The Court was one member short because
Justice Fortas had resigned and Justice Blackmun had not yet taken his seat. Justice
Marshall did not participate. Besides Justices Black and White, of those in the Sinclair
majority, Chief Justice Burger had replaced Chief Justice Warren, Justice Clark had re-
signed, and Justice Stewart had changed his mind. 398 U.S. at 255. Justice Brennan,
author of the dissenting opinion in Sinclair, wrote the Court's opinion in Boys Markets.
351. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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ironic indeed that the very provision that Congress clearly in-
tended to provide additional remedies for breach of collective-
bargaining agreements has been employed to displace previously
existing state remedies. We are not at liberty thus to depart
from the clearly expressed congressional policy to the con-
trary. 3 52 That quoted language suggests that the Court is sim-
ply following congressional will. Thus, eight years after Sinclair
a majority of the Court concluded that "it has become clear that
the Sinclair decision does not further but rather frustrates reali-
zation of an important goal of our national labor policy.
'3 53
The problems of concurrent jurisdiction and the different
remedies available in federal and state court were part of the
reason for overruling Sinclair.354 The Court recognized that Sin-
clair could have been extended to state courts,355 and that the
lack of injunctive relief in state courts would have "devastating
implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements. '356
Thus, the Court in Boys Markets exercised its best judgment in
an effort to further the policy of favoring arbitration in labor
disputes.357
In comparing Sinclair with Boys Markets, it seems clear
that, absent any congressional action, the Court was correct to
exercise its best judgment in deciding whether an injunction was
needed to further the policy favoring arbitration.5 8 Yet, simply
comparing the cases narrows the focus and thus avoids the ques-
tion of how the Court put itself into such a policymaking posi-
tion. Regardless of whether Lincoln Mills was correct as a mat-
ter of labor law, the wisdom of the degree of judicial
policymaking required by that case is questionable. Once the
Court assumed the task of fashioning law governing collective
bargaining agreements from the national labor policy, the Court
was committed to exercising judgment about what makes good
labor law. Although placing heavy reliance on arbitration
avoided some problems, the Court could not avoid deciding
352. Id. at 245.
353. Id. at 241.
354. See id. at 244-47.
355. Id. at 247.
356. Id. The court used the term "equitable remedies" rather than "injunctive
relief."
357. See id. at 247-49.
358. But see id. at 255-61 (Black, J., dissenting).
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cases based upon what the majority considered good policy.
Even if one concludes that such a judicial role constituted the
congressional directive of section 301, serious questions remain
about whether this level of judicial creativity should be consid-
ered exemplary.
While Boys Markets demonstrated that the policy favoring
arbitration outweighed the dangers of enjoining strikes, other
complicated issues remained. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 9 the Court held that an injunction against a
sympathy strike could not issue because of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia prohibition against injunctions in labor disputes. The local
union involved had struck in sympathy with sister locals who
were on strike while negotiating a contract with a common em-
ployer.3 60 The union's contract with the company contained both
a no-strike clause and an arbitration clause; the latter clause was
broad enough to reach an interpretation of the no-strike
clause.36 1 The dispute concerned whether the sympathy strike
violated the no-strike clause and the resolution of that issue was
subject to arbitration.
3 62
The Court distinguished the Boys Markets dispute as one
involving a question subject to binding arbitration.63 In Buffalo
Forge, the strike did not involve an issue arising under the col-
lective bargaining agreement; instead, it involved support of a
sister union.3 64 Since the strike was -not over an arbitrable dis-
pute, an injunction against the strike could not issue even
though the strike itself may have violated an arbitrable no-strike
clause.3 65
Four justices dissented in Buffalo Forge.3 6  The dissent
agreed that the strike did not directly frustrate the arbitration
process. Nevertheless, the dissent noted that such a strike un-
dercut the no-strike clause benefit of uninterrupted production,
359. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
360. Id. at 405.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 410.
363. Id. at 406.
364. Id. at 407-08.
365. The Court emphasized that a court could enjoin the strike if an arbitrator
found the strike to be illegal. Id. at 405.
366. Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Powell,
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and that this effect tended to frustrate the policy of encouraging
employers to agree to binding arbitration.3 6 7 After carefully ana-
lyzing the interests involved in protecting the arbitration pro-
cess, as well as the union's arguments, the dissent concluded
that a court should not always enjoin a sympathy strike when a
collective bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause.368
Rather, the injunction should issue only after the judge has
heard the union's position and has "convincing evidence that the
strike is clearly within the no-strike clause. 3 6 9
Buffalo Forge attracted sharp criticism. 37 0 Professor Arthur
B. Smith, Jr., who was Assistant Professor of Industrial and La-
bor Relations at Cornell University, wrote:
The Supreme Court majority in Buffalo Forge failed to
recognize that when the parties' agreement contains an unqual-
ified no-strike clause, important goals of labor policy are served
by enjoining sympathy work stoppages pending expedited arbi-
tration of the scope of the no-strike obligation. Injunctive relief
pending the arbitrator's decision would strengthen the bargain-
•ing agreement, encourage collective bargaining as an institu-
tion, and. foster utilization of the parties' dispute adjustment
procedures.3 7
1
Two lawyers summarized their conclusions as follows:
The opinion in Buffalo Forge wrongly characterizes the pur-
pose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, frustrates the purpose of
section 301 of the Taft-Harley Act, undermines the policy
favoring arbitration, ignores rules of contract interpretation,
and tramples on the contract rights of the employer. Moreover,
employees gain little from the newly enhanced power of union
leadership or majorities to bind them in sympathy strikes. 72
Professor William B. Gould criticized the decision in these
367. Id. at 423-24.
368. Id. at 431.
369. Id.
370. See generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Recasting
Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REv. 533 (1978); Lowden and Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes,
Arbitration Policy, and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreements-An Analysis of
Buffalo Forge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1977); Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys
Markets, Labor Injunctions and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. CH. L. R.v. 321
(1977).
371. Smith, supra note 370, at 362.
372. Lowden and Flaherty, supra note 370, at 635.
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terms:
The Court's failure to enjoin the strike based on the absence of
an underlying arbitrable dispute improperly applies the poli-
cies developed in earlier decisions. The only possible rationale
for the decision turns upon the proposition that the question of
whether or not a sympathy strike violates a no-strike clause is
somehow more difficult than the question presented in Boys
Markets. But even this logic, which is not articulated in the
opinion, cannot support the per se rule announced in Buffalo
Forge.
37 3
Such criticism does not necessarily mean the Court erred in de-
veloping labor law in Buffalo Forge.3 74 But it does suggest that
the Court engaged in policymaking in an important and perva-
sive way.
The Supreme Court has decided other section 301 issues,
including those raised in suits brought by individual employees
against employers for breaches of collective bargaining agree-
ments. 3 7 For example, the Court has recently decided what stat-
373. Gould, supra note 370, at 545-46. Professor Gould concludes that before issuing
injunctions against strikes pending arbitration, the courts should be "reasonably certain"
that the union violated a no-strike clause. He also believes that the issuance of an in-
junction "should be conditioned upon the willingness of both parties to accede to expe-
dited arbitration." Id. at 552 (footnote omitted).
374. Near the end of the 1981 term, the Supreme Court applied Buffalo Forge's
rationale to conclude that a court could not enjoin union members from refusing to load
cargo bound for the Soviet Union despite the existence of a broad no-strike clause and
an arbitration provision. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982). Interestingly, Justice Marshall wrote the Court's opin-
ion for the six-member majority and was joined by Justice Brennan. Both had joined
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Buffalo Forge. The Court indicated that the em-
ployer had requested the Court to reconsider its decision in Buffalo Forge, but that it
had declined to do so. Id. at 723 n.23. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment on
the grounds that the conclusion was inescapable "[u]nless the Court is willing to overrule
Buffalo Forge." Id. at 724 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell dissented, calling
Buffalo Forge "an abberation" that "should be overruled." Id. at 729-30 (Powell, J., dis-
senting). Justice Stevens also dissented. Id. at 730. But more significantly, Chief Justice
Burger, who had joined the majority in Buffalo Forge, also dissented, concluding that:
"If we must overrule Buffalo Forge to come to a consistent result [with another case
decided during the October 1981 term], we should do so." Id. at 729 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
375. See, e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981)(Employee alleging a union
breach of duty of fair representation and an employer breach of a collective bargaining
agreement need not exhaust internal union procedures unless such procedures could re-
sult in full relief or reactivation of the employee's grievance.); Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976)(An employee may maintain a § 301 action against an
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ute of limitations period applies to employees' actions under sec-
tion 301.376 The Court has also determined the circumstances
under which a successor employer could be compelled to submit
to arbitration based upon an arbitration provision contained in
its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.37 Finally, the
Court has recently held that section 301 grants federal courts
jurisdiction over a local union's suit against its parent union for
breach of the latter's constitution 37 8 In the last case, the Court
proceeded on the theory that a union "constitution may be fairly
characterized as a contract between labor organizations. '37 9 In
assuming jurisdiction of these section 301 suits, the Court inti-
mated that it might exercise its creative powers in still another
area of labor law. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
noted: "We need not decide today what substantive law is to be
applied in [section] 301(a) cases involving union constitutions. It
is enough to observe that the substantive law to apply 'is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our na-
tional labor laws.' ,,380
Some scholars are tempted to applaud judicial policymak-
ing. The reasoned analysis that produces or contributes to judi-
cial decisionmaking, as well as the opportunities for scholarly
criticism of those decisions, appeals to the academic mind. As
demonstrated earlier, a respectable body of opinion advocates
that courts should and do make policy. Of course, some might
also argue that in a democracy, a body as removed from political
responsibility as the Supreme Court should not make policy.
employer based upon a grievance previously rejected in binding arbitration when the
employee can show that the union breached its duty of fair representation.); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Fox and Senenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of
Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1980).
376. United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (In an employee's § 301
action, when the employee's discharge had been upheld in an arbitration proceeding, the
court properly chose the state limitations period applicable to an action to vacate an
arbitration award.).
377. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel Employees
Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 545 (1964).
378. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting In-
dus. v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
379. Id. at 619.
380. Id. at 627 (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456
(1957)). The Court also left unresolved whether state law would be a source of federal
law, id., and whether union members could sue their union for violations of the union
constitution. Id. at 627 n.16.
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That question, however, should not be confronted in absolute
terms. The better question is to ask how deeply should courts
become involved in settling difficult political controversies?
Sometimes courts should risk involvement because of the need
for developing particular areas of substantive law. On the other
hand, Congress arguably had an obligation to resolve some of
the policy problems left unanswered after the enactment of sec-
tion 301.
The question of the extent to which a court should exercise
its creative abilities to make law and develop policy yields mixed
conclusions. Caution in deciding political issues is often war-
ranted, but it is difficult to deny a court the power to use its best
judgment when the legislature has failed to clearly dictate the
result. To many observers, especially those with a deep interest
in the substantive result of a particular case, concerns about the
proper judicial role in creating policy may fade in comparison
with considerations about the proper development of substan-
tive law. The discussion of these individual cases illustrates the
nature of some of the questions courts decide. But what seems
to be lacking is some agreed basis for deciding when courts
should exercise self-restraint and when courts should plunge
headlong into the resolution of an issue that the legislature has
failed to decide. While courts ideally should avoid making
changes in politically sensitive areas in which the legislature has
failed to act,38 1 the development of substantive law may require
a decision. In this situation, judicial action poses an inviting al-
ternative to legislative impotence. The immediacy of substantive
needs may well relegate process considerations to a secondary
role. When that occurs, a particular case is treated as an excep-
tion from the dictates of principles governing the proper judicial
role. Some may begin to suspect that when a court or individual
judge supports a conclusion with arguments about the proper ju-
dicial role, the process points merely cover a substantive
position.
One difficulty is that a court's single substantive decision
rarely results in such disastrous consequences that the decision
381. See Wellington and Albert, supra note 129, at 1563. A similar notion is that a
court's application of a statute should not interfere with important state and local con-
cerns absent a clear mandate from Congress. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981); FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941).
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is viewed as clearly wrong. Even if a given decision is clearly
wrong, a single wrong decision does not condemn those who
make it or the process by which it was made. A firm conclusion
that a court did a poor job would be an insufficient reason for
deciding the allocation of policymaking power between the
courts and the legislatures. One would have to conclude further
that the legislature would have performed a better job.
The commitment to two often opposing values further com-
plicates the problem. Most scholars believe in the value of well-
reasoned decisions. In a system of developing law through prece-
dent, such a value has one function. When applied to making
policy based on a consideration of social, political and economic
facts, that value also seems appealing. The ability to reach rea-
soned decisions, however, differs depending upon the process a
judge uses to extend precedent: a confined process of using a
series of cases combined with the material facts of the case at
bar, or a more liberal process of using the judicial perception of
current economic, social and political facts. Policymaking is in-
volved in both, but to a far greater degree in the latter.
Against the value of reasoned decisions stands the value of
political responsibility in a democracy. The latter value counsels
strongly that legislatures should decide policy issues based on
economic, social and political facts. Decisions of legislative ma-
jorities, however, often war with decisions that many would
reach by reasoned judgment. Perhaps it is this conflict of values,
a conflict that tends to evade resolution,382 that accounts for the
conclusory way in which judges and commentators couch argu-
ments about the proper judicial function.
Still, judicial policymaking must be analyzed at a more de-
tailed level. Process and substance must remain intertwined, and
certainly a process that produces bad decisions cannot be con-
sidered good. Similarly, while a process is judged by its results, a
single good result cannot justify a poor process. Rather than deal
with the process question as subsidiary to the result in any par-
ticular case, a careful analysis of judicial policymaking in areas
in which the legislature is involved might yield important bene-
382. Perhaps this overstates the point, except in the sense that difficult issues tend
to remain unresolved. Some commentators have attempted to reconcile judicial decision-
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fits. Regardless of the substantive results of the cases discussed
in this part, the nature of the policy issues handled by the Su-
preme Court suggests that arguments attacking judicial poli-
cymaking should not be dismissed lightly. Perhaps the best ap-
proach is to consider carefully policymaking in each case by
asking not only whether the Court reached a good decision, but
also whether the judicial role was exemplary, or one to be
avoided absent overriding considerations.
By analyzing a case in this fashion, it is possible to conclude
that a court reached a correct result despite excessive poli-
cymaking and at the same time bemoan the need for such judi-
cial policymaking. This view would recognize the need for judi-
cial action given the particular circumstances, but would also
seek to prevent praise for the decision from encouraging unbri-
dled judicial policymaking. While this position may cloud the
clarity of criticism about a single decision, the approach is sug-
gested here because of the need for closer analysis of judicial
policymaking.
As the cases discussed in this part illustrate, substantive
needs often require judicial creativity when the legislature has
failed to provide reasonable guidance. When a court reaches a
praiseworthy substantive result, other courts tend to imitate the
methodology used in reaching the result. While good results
should and do invite imitation of methodology, too often the leg-
islatures leave the courts with inadequate guidance. Certainly
courts should strive to reach the best result, even if it requires
creativity. But correct results often obscure methodological
problems. Thus, the problem of judicial creativity must be con-
sidered in terms other than the validity of a particular substan-
tive result or generalized notions of whether courts should make
policy in a democratic society.8 3 Neither level adequately con-
fronts the real issue of the wisdom of judicial creativity in statu-
383. In arguing for a common-law function for courts in dealing with statutes, Pro-
fessor Calabresi states that this function "is no more and no less than the critical task
of deciding when a retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an ex-
isting statutory or common law rule." D. CALABREsI, supra note 100, at 164 (emphasis in
original). If one accepts Calabresi's position, then the discussion centers on when courts
should engage in judicial creativity in applying a statute. That discussion, in turn, could
involve an analysis on a level similar to the one advocated here. This Article examines
the ramifications of judicial policymaking in particular categories of cases, rather than
arguments about the wisdom of judicial creativity generally.
[Vol. 35
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tory areas.
One approach is to delineate categories of cases whose char-
acteristics should affect the extent of judicial creativity. One
such category is considered in the second part of this Article:
cases in which courts through "interpretation" grant substantial
power to administrative agencies. While the discussion will focus
on cable television, special considerations apply to these deci-
sions. The discussion will first analyze these decisions in the
context of the general administrative law governing the relation-
ship of courts to agencies as well as to legislatures. Then, by con-
sidering in detail one case, 84 the discussion will examine the
problems engendered when the Supreme Court grants substan-
tial power to an administrative agency when Congress has exer-
cised no substantial policymaking role.
II. JUDICIAL GRANTS OF POWER TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
When a court interprets a statute to confer power on an ad-
ministrative agency, the problems that decision creates should
receive close attention. While some of the considerations in-
volved stem from general ideas about the proper judicial role in
a democratic society, this category of decisions creates special
problems. Section A of this part will use general administrative
law principles to analyze those decisions granting power to ad-
ministrative agencies. Section B of this part will examine the
particular problems raised by these grants of power, using the
FCC's jurisdiction over cable television as an example.3 5
A. Judicial Creativity and Administrative Power
Because courts confine administrative activity to the limits
384. The case, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), is a
striking example of a court granting an administrative agency authority without any leg-
islative attempt to resolve conflicting interests or to establish public policy in a particu-
lar area. This is not the first time that an article has used a single case to illustrate a
general idea about statutory interpretation. See Bishin, supra note 3, at 4, where he
states: "Therefore the scope of this article has been restricted to a study in depth of one
case. This choice, I think, should not impair the argument's claim to general validity, for
the case considered involves all of thd important law finding methods and represents one
of the most comprehensive statements of the law finding approach."
385. See infra notes 421, 422 and accompanying text.
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established by enabling legislation,386 the scope of agency power
may depend upon whether a court exercises its creative power in
applying the enabling statute. Thus, a court willing to exercise
some discretion in statutory interpretation could decide that an
agency possesses powers not expressly delegated by the legisla-
ture.387 At times the legislative directive may be so vague or the
court so creative that critics might conclude that a particular de-
cision embodies judicial policy rather than legislative intent.38s
Conversely, the courts may confine the public interest standard
through more traditional methods of statutory interpretation
and thus limit the agency's actions to implementing clearly ex-
pressed legislative objectives. 8 9
Under the traditional model of administrative law, the legis-
lature delegates power to administrative agencies which then im-
plement the legislature's policies.390 One commentator has sug-
gested that this model "conceives of the agency as a mere
transmission belt for implementing legislative directives."391
This philosophy finds support in the idea that only elected rep-
resentatives should make policy. 39 2 Thus, the traditional model,
because it retains the legislature as the policy-making body, re-
sembles the restricted judicial role in administering statutes dis-
cussed previously in section B of part I. This view of the sepa-
386. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATm LAW 429 (1976).
387. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 308-13
(1953).
388. See, e.g., Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 AD. L. Rnv.
407, 420 (1970). Judicially upheld administrative power appears unbridled in some cases.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 386, at 46-47. Schwartz asserts that some congressional delega-
tions are upheld even though the standards are "illusory." Id. at 45. See also Martin,
Legislative Delegations of Power and Judicial Review-Preventing Judicial Impotence,
8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 43, 58 (1980).
389. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. at 308-13 (1953);
New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932). See also Martin,
supra note 388, at 47-48 (discussing a "necessary and proper" standard).
390. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 386, at 35; Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1675 (1975).
391. Stewart, supra note 390, at 1675.
392. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where
Justice Harlan stated that the traditional doctrine "insures that the fundamental policy
decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official, but by the body imme-
diately responsible to the people." See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 386, at 35; Stewart,
supra note 390, at 1675; Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Century, 29 AD. L.
REv. 291, 295 (1977).
393. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
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ration of powers doctrine would, if followed, prevent the
judiciary from delegating power to administrative agencies.39
4
The federal courts have not applied the doctrine rigidly, but
have required only that the legislature establish ascertainable
standards to govern administrative action.3 95
The courts have used two approaches in determining
whether legislative standards are sufficient to govern administra-
tive action. Under one approach, legislative standards are suffi-
cient if they enable a court to determine whether the agency has
complied with the legislative policy or will.3ee Under the other
approach, courts will limit through statutory interpretation 397
such vague standards as the "public interest," although courts
have occasionally upheld standardless delegations.398 One com-
mentator has observed that courts often supply the standards:39
a function the courts have usurped from the legislature and may
not be equipped to handle.400 The judicial creation of standards
to govern administrative action, however, may not represent a
particularly negative development to those who accept a creative
judicial role in administering statutes. Thus, the traditional
394. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 386, at 35.
395. Id. at 33-35.
396. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944):
[T]he only concern of courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress has
been obeyed. This depends not upon the breadth of the definition of the facts
or conditions which the administrative officer is to find but upon the determi-
nation whether the definition sufficiently marks the field within which the Ad-
ministrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in
compliance with the legislative will.
Accord, McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1127 (1977). See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1953), in which he wrote: "The principle that authority granted by the legislature must
be limited by adequate standards ... prevents judicial review from becoming merely an
exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against which to judge the
official action that has been challenged."
397. See, e.g., NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1976). See also Jaffe, The Illu-
sion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1183, 1191-92 (1973).
398. K. DAvis, AnMINISTmrsE LAW TEXT 28-30 (3d ed. 1972).
399. Koslow, supra note 388, at 407, 420.
400. Id. at 420-21. Stewart suggests that permitting courts to resolve policy issues
where the legislature has delegated broad discretionary power to administrative agencies
"is wholly inconsistent with our received constitutional premises." He also believes that
the more the question of agency choice comes to resemble a political process of weighing
the claims of competing interest groups, the less the apparent justification for judicial
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model, which requires legislative standards to govern adminis-
trative action, is modified if coupled with the view that courts
are creative partners with the legislatures.
The other model, the interest representation model, focuses
on the political decision involved in the delegation of power to
an administrative agency. According to this model, the legisla-
ture may be unable or unwilling to make certain decisions, and
this indecision results in power delegations without meaningful
standards or directions. 401 Because such standardless delegations
tend to shift the political process from the legislature to the
agency,40 2 the inquiry here is not whether sufficient legislative
standards exist, but whether and to what extent the agency con-
siders the affected interests.03 Thus, to check the agency's
power, the courts would act to ensure adequate interest
401. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 390, at 1695. Jaffe also criticized the view that
legislatures are unable to make detailed policy decisions. Jaffe, supra note 397, at 1189-
90.
402.
Nor can a political conflict be avoided by relegating a problem to the care of an
agency and invoking the talisman of "expertise." The effect of such a transfer
of function is simply to shift the legislative process to a different level, and
there is no reason to believe that the agency will be able to rise above power
conflicts to achieve solutions that the legislature itself cannot or does not
choose to provide.
Jaffe, supra note 397, at 1190. In discussing "broad and sometimes standardless" delega-
tions, Judge McGowan observed that "[i]n such situations, the question of the scope of
judicial review is essentially a problem of allocating Congress's unfinished lawmaking
tasks among two sets of unelected officials-judges and administrators." McGowan,
supra note 396, at 1166 (emphasis added).
403. See Stewart, supra note 390, at 1760-61. Stewart does not accept interest rep-
resentation as a general model for administrative law. After rejecting a number of solu-
tions to the problem of uncontrolled administration discretion, he concludes:
The only conceivable way out of the labyrinth would seem to be a new and
comprehensive theory of government and law that would successfully reconcile
our traditional ideals of formal justice, individual autonomy, and responsible
mechanisms for collective choice, with the contemporary realities of decentral-
ized, uncoordinated, discretionary exercises of government authority and sub-
stantial disparities in the cohesiveness and political power of private interests.
Such a conception may well be unattainable, and in any event will not be
achieved in the foreseeable future.
Id. at 1807. Stewart then suggests that perhaps "the ideal of a unitary theory of adminis-
trative law is untenable." Id. However, Stewart does see interest representation "as a
logical and inevitable response" to conditions and concedes that "[c]onceivably, the in-
terest representation model might develop into an acceptable solution" to the received
models to control an expanded government. Id. at 1811, 1813. See Malrite T.V. of N.Y.
v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1152 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1143 (1982).
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representation. 04
Under the interest representation model, questions about
when courts should interfere with policy decisions still arise.40 5
But to the extent that all affected interests are represented in
the administrative process, such agency policymaking does not
present the same legitimacy problems that plague the traditional
model.40 This does not mean the interest representation model
lacks substantial difficulties.0 7 Rather, because the interest rep-
resentation model provides for adjusting various interests in par-
ticular areas by the same type of interplay between parties that
occurs in the legislative arena, it is a viable option. Since the
interest representation model affords all affected interests an op-
portunity for policy adjustment in accordance with their needs,
the level of that adjustment at the administrative, rather than
legislative level, should not raise doubts about the process.
40 8
The propriety of a court granting to an agency substantial
power that cannot fairly be traced to legislative action is a dif-
ferent question. Neither model will terminate such decisions.
The traditional model holds that the legislature delegates power
to the administrative agency. If one accepts judicial creativity in
404. Stewart, supra note 390, at 1808. See also Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1805, 1820 (1978).
405. Stewart, supra note 390, at 1808-09. Stewart does view judicial imposition of
interest representation as "consonant with our traditions and. . . perhaps ... inevita-
ble" given the lack of legislative or executive action to remedy the problems posed by the
current level of administrative discretion. Id. at 1809. But cf. Breyer, Vermont Yankee
and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 H-Lv. L. REv. 1833 (1978).
Breyer states:
The ultimate issue presented by Vermont Yankee is the proper role of the
courts in the debate over nuclear power. Since that debate has been lively and
effective in the political arena, and since one cannot reasonably argue that im-
portant health, safety, or environmental interests lie on only one side of that
debate, the courts, I believe, should play a limited role, affecting as little as
possible the outcome of that debate.
Id. at 1845.
406. Stewart discusses and rejects the idea of using representative principles to con-
trol administrative agencies, including the direct election of agency members. Stewart,
supra note 390, at 1790-1802.
407. See, e.g., id. at 1762-90.
408. At the broadest level, of course, an agency cannot create itself or empower it-
self to discharge functions unrelated to its statutory mandate. Power ultimately must be
traced to the Constitution. This discussion assumes an existing agency created by the
legislature and possessing arguably relevant powers. Also, an agency remains susceptible
to congressional power even though the delegation is extremely broad. See, e.g., Jaffe,
supra note 397, at 1188-90.
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statutory application, then the courts operate as legislative part-
ners by determining the scope of delegated power. This tradi-
tional model is not undercut by judicial extensions of power. On
the other hand, the interest representation model focuses on in-
cluding affected interests within the administrative process.
Again, the courts' extension of power does not seriously under-
cut the model. Of course, those who view the separation of pow-
ers doctrine as limiting government activity will criticize deci-
sions expanding agency power under either model. Under the
traditional model, these critics will attack the judicial usurpa-
tion of legislative power; under the interest representation
model, they will argue that only the legislature should adjust
conflicting interests.
A judicial grant of power to an agency is not necessarily a
standardless delegation. As mentioned earlier, courts may use
statutory construction to restrict agency power, previously ex-
panded by judicial interpretation, to the overall purposes estab-
lished in the enabling act.409 Unfortunately, courts are some-
times unable to discern the standards supposedly drawn by the
legislature.4 10 Each situation has its unique factors: in some in-
stances courts can confine previously judicially expanded power
to the enabling statute's overall purposes, but in other situations
the nature of the power or the statute, or both, will be such that
courts cannot draw limiting standards from legislative action. In
any event, when the grant of power is so tenuously related to the
statutory language that one may infer that the court, not the
legislature, granted such power, a distinct possibility exists that
limiting purposes cannot be derived from the legislative his-
tory.411 In such circumstances courts must delimit the power.
In summary, concepts of judicial creativity in statutory ap-
plication can be combined with accepted models of administra-
tive law to support judicial expansion of agency jurisdiction and
power. Still, traditional notions about the separation of powers
doctrine might lead some to view with skepticism such judicial
action. Regardless of one's views, any evaluation of the wisdom
of judicial creativity must consider individual cases. The Su-
409. See supra note 389.
410. See supra notes 398 and 399.
411. In these cases, a court conceivably could find limiting provisions in the applica-
ble statute. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (II), 440 U.S. 689, 699-708 (1979).
[Vol. 35
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preme Court's "grant" of power to the Federal Communications
Commission to regulate cable television is just such a case."12
B. FCC Jurisdiction Over Cable Television
The Communications Act of 1934 (the Act) applies to "all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio. 4 13 That
Act created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio."414 Title I of the Act, which contains those broad
jurisdictional provisions, does not contain any specific provisions
regarding the regulation of common carriers or radio broadcast-
ers. Instead, Title II of the Act contains provisions applicable to
regulation of common carriers by wire and radio,415 and Title III
contains provisions governing the regulation of radio and televi-
sion broadcasting.416 Cable television does not clearly fall within
either Title II or Title 111,417 and in any event, the Commission
has never asserted jurisdiction under either of those titles be-
cause such jurisdiction is both questionable and problematic.418
Nevertheless, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,41 9 the
Supreme Court held that Title I confers upon the FCC jurisdic-
tion to regulate cable television, even though that title arguably
contains mostly prefatory provisions.420
Congress made no provision for cable television in the Com-
munications Act because the medium did not exist at that
412. The "grant" was made in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968).
413. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
414. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
415. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 224 of Title 47, which
governs cable television pole attachments, was added in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92
Stat. 35-36 (1978). Congress enacted section 224 after the Supreme Court held that the
FCC's jurisdiction covered CATV. Therefore, that statute does not affect this discussion.
416. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-339 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
417. Berman, CATV Leased-Access Channels and the FCC: The Intractable Juris-
diction Question, 51 NoTE DAhm LAW. 145, 146 (1975).
418. See Barnett, State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 685, 723-24 (1972); Botein, Jurisdictional and Antitrust Considerations
in the Regulation of the New Communications Technologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
863, 866-67 (1980); Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The
Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427, 497 (1975).
419. 392 U.S. 157, 167-78 (1968).
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time.421 In fact, as late as 1975 Congress still had not established
a cable television policy, leading one commentator to state:
"[T]he Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over cable has
resulted from judicial interpretation of the Act, rather than from
express congressional directive. It is the judiciary which has ulti-
mately determined the critical issues in the broadcast-cable dis-
pute. ' 42  Thus, it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, not Con-
gress, granted the FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television.
Whether judicial creativity is appropriate in cases "grant-
ing" power to administrative agencies is questionable. One ob-
jection is that courts cannot resolve on a reasoned basis conflicts
between competing industry groups. Another objection is that
courts cannot act in this situation on the basis of agreed or
shared values.
In any event, any discussion of judicial grants of. power to
administrative agencies must consider the powers of both agen-
cies and courts. One writer, for example, has stated that admin-
istrative agencies have forged governmental policy in cable tele-
vision regulation because Congress provided no statutory policy
guidance.423 Yet, because courts review agency action, the courts
could overturn any agency's policy. Judicial options concerning
agency policy are numerous. A court could grant an agency
broad power through an expansive statutory interpretation. A
421. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 162 n.12 ("CATV
systems were evidently first established on a noncommercial basis in 1949."); id. at 162
("the establishment of the first commercial [CATV] system in 1950"); id. at 172 ("Cer-
tainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the development of community antenna
television systems."); Memorandum Opinion and Order in the Matter of the Amendment
of Subpart L, Part 91, 6 F.C.C.2d. 309, 330 (1967) (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting) ("The Com-
munications Act was passed in 1934 when television was still wholly experimental and
CATV was unheard of."); Barrow, The New CATV Rules: Proceed on Delayed Yellow,
25 VAND. L. REV. 681, 690 (1972); Botein, supra note 418, at 867 ("The original Commu-
nications Act contained no mention of cable television, largely because cable existed only
in highly experimental form in 1934."). See also United States v. Midwest Video Corp.
(I), 406 U.S. 649, 650 (1972) (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan); id. at 675 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("Congress could not anticipate the advent of CATV when it enacted
the regulatory scheme nearly 40 years ago.").
422. Hagelin, supra note 418, at 498. In 1972 Congress applied the "equal time"
provisions, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976), to cable television systems. Pub. L. No. 92-225,
Title I, § 104(c), 86 Stat. 7 (1972) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1976)). While that
action constitutes recognition of some FCC authority over cable television, it is not a
grant of general regulatory authority and does not amount to policy direction to the FCC
regarding general regulation of cable systems.
423. Berman, supra note 417, at 145.
[Vol. 35
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court could also interpret a statute as granting jurisdiction to an
agency, but only in accordance with judicially defined standards.
A court could also slowly expand an agency's jurisdiction while
examining or reviewing agency decisions made under the in-
creasing scope of jurisdiction. Thus, courts establish a substan-
tial amount of policy when they exercise judicial creativity in
interpreting jurisdictional statutes.
In short, a court makes law by granting power to an admin-
istrative agency. At the next level of policymaking, the agency
wields substantial power, no less effectively than if the legisla-
ture had directed the agency to act "in the public interest." In
both cases, the court retains the power to review agency deci-
sionmaking along a continuum of deference, from superficial re-
view to close scrutiny. Once the court grants jurisdiction to the
agency, the question of whether the court or the agency will
make specific policy arises. A court that grants jurisdiction may
eschew a detailed policymaking role by giving great deference to
policies formulated by the agency.
To summarize this overall framework, a judicial grant of
power to an administrative agency involves two levels of policy-
making: judicial and administrative. The creative judicial act in
granting jurisdiction to an agency bypasses the legislature. This
omission is noteworthy because the legislature ordinarily grants
power to an agency. Nevertheless, the legislature remains free to
change the situation by statute. In addition, because the legisla-
ture controls the agency's budget, the legislature retains the
power to influence agency power through less formal means.
This Article analyzes judicial grants of power to administra-
tive agencies by focusing on the Supreme Court's decision grant-
ing the FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television. This Article
does not, however, present a thorough history of cable television
regulation. Many articles have discussed that subject.42 4 Still, a
424. See, e.g., Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 501 (1977); Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I:
Control of Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1970); Barnett,
supra note 418; Barnett and Greenberg, A Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968
WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Barnett and Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An Analysis of
FCC Policy and Alternatives, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 562 (1969); Barrow, supra
note 421; Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive
Audience, 61 VA. L. REV. 515 (1975); Berman, supra note 417; Besen, The Economics of
the Cable Television "Consensus", 17 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1974); Botein, supra note 418;
1984]
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brief sketch of the historical background is necessary for a
proper understanding of the problems involved in the FCC's at-
tempt to regulate cable television.
From the advent of commercial television broadcasting, the
FCC licensed television stations to serve individual localities
rather than larger regions. 25 Cable television began by providing
reception in communities unable to receive conventional sig-
nals. 26 The cable industry expanded by offering improved local
Botein, Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Cable Television, 24 CATH. U.L. REV.
777 (1975); Botein, The FCC's Proposed CATV Regulations, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 244
(1970); Botein, CATV Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 816
(1970); Chazen and Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1970); Collins, The Future of Cable Communications and the Fair-
ness Doctrine, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 833 (1975); Comanor and Mitchell, The Costs of Plan-
ning: The FCC and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & EcON. 177 (1972); Danielson and
Wheeler, The Status of the Cable Antenna Television Industry in California and A
Proposal for State Regulation, 2 PAC. L.J. 528 (1971); Gerlach, Toward the Wired Soci-
ety: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals for a National Policy on Cable Technology, 25
ME. L. REv. 193 (1973); Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the Revised Copy-
right Act, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 263 (1978); Greenberg, Wire Television and the FCC's
Second Report and Order on CATV Systems, 10 J.L. & ECON. 181 (1967); Hagelin,
supra note 418; Hochberg, A Step into the Regulatory Vacuum: Cable Television in the
District of Columbia, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 63 (1971); Kahn, Cable, Competition, and the
Commission, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 854 (1975); Krasnow and Quale, Developing Legal Is-
sues in Cable Communications, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 677 (1975); LaPierre, Cable Televi-
sion and the Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25 (1973); LeDuc,
The FCC v. CATV et al: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Act, 23 FED. Com. B.J. 93
(1969); LeDuc, Control of Cable Television: The Senseless Assault on States' Rights, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 795 (1975); Mahony, Cable Television's Jurisdictional Dispute, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 872 (1975); Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regu-
latory Policy, 15 J.L. & ECON. 207 (1972); Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Televi-
sion Competition Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800 (1974); Popham, The 1971 Consensus
Agreement: The Perils of Unkept Promises, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 813 (1975); Price, Re-
quiem for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L. REV. 541 (1975);
Rivkin, The Changing Signals of Cable T.V., 60 GEO. L.J. 1475 (1972); Shoenberger, The
FCC, Cable TV, and Visions of Valhalla: Judicial Scrutiny of Complex Rulemaking
and Institutional Competence, 14 U. Rich. L. Rev. 113 (1979); Smith, Local Taxation of
Cable Television Systems: The Constitutional Problems, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 755 (1975);
Verrill, CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or Common Carrier?, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 586 (1969); Wallach, Whose Intent? A Study of Administrative Preemption:
State Regulation of Cable Television, 25 CASE IV. RES. L. REV. 258 (1975); Walsh,
CATV: Let the Cables Grow, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 205 (1972); Wiley, Procedural Accomoda-
tion of Federal and State Regulatory Interests in Cable Television, 25 AD. L. REV. 213
(1973). Many student works on cable television, some of which are cited in this Article,
have also appeared in law reviews. See also D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC:
A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973); L. Ross, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FOuNDATIONS OF
CABLE TELEVISION (1974).
425. L. Ross, supra note 424, at 11; Comanor and Mitchell, supra note 424, at 182.
426. Comment, Federal and State Regulation of Cable Television: Analysis of the
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reception and signals of distant stations not receivable by con-
ventional means.427 It became clear that by importing signals
from distant markets, cable television could alter the broadcast-
ing market structure.428 Today, satellites instantaneously beam
cable "superstations" from coast to coast.4 9 Cable companies
also offer pay channels at a premium above the basic subscrip-
tion fee, further increasing the range of possible programming.
430
By 1981 the cable industry, with revenues of 2.3 billion dollars,
was building systems offering from thirty to one hundred chan-
nels.45 1 Perhaps the most important difference between cable
and regular television is that unlike regular television, an indi-
vidual cable channel need not attempt to attract the widest pos-
sible audience. This difference produces programming of more
limited appeal.432 In the future, cable may offer a variety of op-
portunities for community use. Some day professionals, business
people, and at-home shoppers may use cable television's two-
way communication capabilities. 433 The political world is well
aware of cable's potential. A Cabinet committee noted that cable
television
could provide minority groups, ethnic groups, the aged, the
young, or people living in the same neighborhood an opportu-
nity to express, and to see expressed, their own views. Yet it
would also enable all of these groups to be exposed to the views
New FCC Rules, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1151, 1151. "Cable television first developed commer-
cially (under the name 'community antenna television' or CATV .. .) in the early 1950's
as a system for bringing television service to rural and mountain areas which would oth-
erwise have no service at all or less than a complete compliment of network stations." L.
Ross, supra note 424, at 15.
427. L. Ross, supra note 424, at 15.
428. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1968).
429. The State of the Superstations, BROADCASTING, July 23, 1979, at 29. The possi-
bility that cable television would become national in scope was recognized over ten years
ago. See, e.g., Note, Cable Television: A Regulatory Dilemma, 13 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L.
REv. 326, 326 (1971).
430. A Short Course in Cable-1981, BROADCASTING, June 1, 1981, at 50.
431. Id.
432. D. LEDUc, supra note 424, at 14. In 1972 Barrow wrote that "CATV's large
number of available channels will encourage the formation of information and entertain-
ment utilities from which the discriminating subscriber will select freely." Barrow, supra
note 421, at 687. "[A] national system of wired city television ... is the best avenue to
more and more varied programs. Television would then have capacity and incentive to
educate, inform, and entertain specialized interests as well as general interests and mass
tastes." Barnett and Greenberg, supra note 424, at 2.
433. Barrow, supra note 421, at 687-88.
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of others, free of the homogeneity which characterizes contem-
porary television programming.434
Despite, or perhaps because of, cable television's possibili-
ties, the FCC was concerned that cable threatened local stations'
over-the-air programming,435 especially UHF stations.436 Cable
television affects UHF broadcasters in two ways: By providing
more stations and greater diversity in programming, cable di-
verts viewers from local stations. On the other hand, by improv-
ing UHF reception, cable enhances the ability of UHF stations
to compete with VHF stations.37 It is questionable whether the
FCC possessed solid information on this issue when it decided
that cable would have a diversionary impact on UHF. 38
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,439 the Su-
preme Court considered an FCC restriction on a cable television
company's importation of distant signals. The restriction was
434. THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 15 (1974). The Committee viewed cable television as somewhat of a panacea:
Cable offers countless Americans a chance to speak for themselves and among
themselves in their own way, and a chance to share with one another their
experiences, their opinions, their frustrations, and their hopes. Rather than in-
crease the alienation of individual from individual and group from group, cable
could combine the shared experience of national television with a type of activ-
ity participation in the political and social process that was common in the
days before urbanization eroded the opportunity for personal involvement in
events that affected the community.
Id.
435. See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 65 F.C.C.2d 9, 10 (1977); Comment, Federal and
State Regulation of Cable Television: An Analysis of the New FCC Rules, 1971 DuKE
LJ. 1151, 1156; Note, The Federal Communications Commission and Regulation of
CATV, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 117, 124 (1968).
436. See, e.g., Report, Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 646 (1979); Chazen and Ross, supra
note 424, at 1836. The Supreme Court recognized the goal of protecting UHF television
when it upheld FCC jurisdiction over cable television in United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968).
437. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1143 (1982). When the FCC adopted rules allowing cable systems to import a
limited number of distant signals, the Commission, in light of the inconclusive evidence,
opined: "[T]he improvements that cable will make in clearer UHF pictures and wider
UHF coverage will offset the inroads on UHF audiences made by the limited number of
distant signals that our rules would permit." Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 169 (1972).
438. Chazen and Ross, supra note 424, at 1836, 1836 n.55. But see United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 176 n.44 (1968).
439. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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designed to protect a local television station.440 The FCC had
earlier declined to exercise jurisdiction over cable television
441
and had sought, without success, legislation to clarify its author-
ity to regulate cable television.442 While the only FCC action was
to restrict expansion of the Southwestern cable system pending
hearings, 443 the case raised the question of whether the FCC pos-
sessed jurisdiction to regulate cable television service.444
Even though cable operators are neither broadcasters nor
common carriers by wire, and thus fall outside the Communica-
tions Act's specific regulatory provisions, the Supreme Court
held that the general provision in Title I that applies the Act to
"all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio" con-
fers upon the FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television."5 In
analyzing this decision, one must realize that the national broad-
casting system, because of the technical nature of signals and
the FCC's favor of local service, had assumed the characteristics
of limited market areas, each having a limited number of sta-
tions.446 The FCC apparently warned the Supreme Court that a
decision rendering the FCC powerless over cable television
might lead to the collapse of the market structure, thereby de-
priving the public of local broadcast benefits.44 The Court
noted, however, that the "Commission acknowledged . . . it
could not predict with certainty the consequences of unregu-
lated" cable television.44 The Court summarized the situation as
follows:
The Commission has been charged with broad responsibil-
440. Id. at 159-60.
441. See, e.g., Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1143 (1982); Berman, supra note 417, at 148-50.
442. 392 U.S. at 164-65. See Berman, supra note 417, at 150-51.
443. 392 U.S. at 160, 181.
444. Id. at 161.
445. Id. at 172, 178.
446. Id. at 173-74. See also FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475-76
(1940); Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
447. 392 U.S. at 173-76.
448. Id. at 176-77. While the FCC was particularly concerned about cable's impact
on UHF and educational broadcasters, the Supreme Court observed that by importing
distant signals, cable could significantly affect local television service generally. The
Court also noted that the case involved a dispute over whether "local, advertiser-sup-
ported stations" were the proper basis for the "national system of television broadcast-
ing." Id. at 177 n.45.
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ities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of
local television broadcasting. The significance of its efforts can
scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is demonstrably a
principal source of information and entertainment for a great
part of the Nation's population. The Commission has reasona-
bly found that the successful performance of these duties de-
mands prompt and efficacious regulation of community an-
tenna television systems .... 449
Having set the factual context, the Court stated the applica-
ble rule: "We have elsewhere held that we may not, 'in the ab-
sence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention
...prohibit administrative action imperative for the achieve-
ment of an agency's ultimate purposes.' ,,45o Thus, the Court
framed the question as whether Congress prohibited the FCC
from regulating cable television. Since cable television did not
exist in 1934 when the Act was adopted,'45 1 and since the views
of any subsequent Congress were of little significance,452 the
question left room for only one answer. Finding no evidence that
Congress intended to prohibit the Commission from exercising
jurisdiction, the Court held that the FCC has authority to regu-
late cable television.
453
The Court's reliance on the Permian Basin Rate Cases
454
for the rule applied in Southwestern warrants mention. In Per-
mian, the regulatory power at issue was granted by judicial deci-
sion in the face of agency abnegation of that authority.455 Fur-
449. Id. at 177.
450. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780
(1980)).
451. See supra note 421.
452. 392 U.S. at 170. Although the Court suggested that Congress may have failed to
act in 1959 because it believed the FCC's jurisdiction included cable television, the Court
nevertheless acknowledged that the issue discussed during the Senate floor debate was
whether the FCC should have such jurisdiction. Id. at 171 n.33.
453. Id. at 178.
454. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
455. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 755-56 (1968). In Phillips, the Supreme Court held that
the FPC had jurisdiction to regulate the rates charged for natural gas despite the FPC's
failure to assert such jurisdiction. For a criticism of the subsequent regulation of such
rates, see Breyer and MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natu-
ral Gas Producers, 86 HA~v. L. REv. 941 (1973). See also Fiorino, Judicial-Administra-
tive Interaction in Regulatory Policy Making: The Case of the Federal Power Commis-
sion, 28 AD. L. REv. 41 (1976); Kitch, Regulation of the Feld Market for Natural Gas By
the Federal Power Commission, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 243 (1968); Meeks and Landeck, Area
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ther, Permian involved an interpretation of an act long after
agency jurisdiction had been established. 56 In any case, the
holding in Permian was premised on a general statutory inter-
pretation rather than specific statutory provisions. 7
After concluding that the FCC's jurisdiction covered cable
television, the Court's next step was to delimit the FCC's regula-
tory power. Lacking any "congressional purpose" input or spe-
cific legislative pronouncement, the Supreme Court held that
the FCC's authority over cable television "is restricted to that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting.
4 5
Predictably, the "reasonably ancillary" standard presents
problems of interpretation. Arguably, "reasonably ancillary" in
the context of Southwestern Cable describes, and therefore lim-
its, FCC jurisdiction to those actions that protect television
broadcasters.459 The FCC, however, adopted a broader view of
its authority. For example, in seeking to regulate certain
nonvideo communications, the FCC asserted: "In our regulatory
actions regarding cable television, we have maintained that the
services of cable are indivisible. The jurisdiction recognized by
Rate Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry, 1970 DuKE L.J. 653.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Phillips is noteworthy. He concluded his dissenting opin-
ion as follows:
There is much to be said in terms of policy for the position of Commis-
sioner Schott, who dissented the first time the Commission ruled it had no
jurisdiction over these sales. But the history and language of the Act are
against it. If that ground is to be taken, the battle should be in Congress, not
here. Regulation of the business of producing and gathering natural gas in-
volves considerations of which we know little and with which we are not com-
petent to deal.
347 U.S. at 690 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In Permian, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's use of area rate regulation
of producer prices. The Court noted that the Commission's regulation of producer prices
under the traditional cost of service approach produced a tremendous backlog of cases.
390 U.S. at 757 n.13.
456. 390 U.S. at 756.
457. In Permian, the Court emphasized that the Act's provisions did not specifically
apply. Id. at 755. However, the argument here is that the Court, not Congress, granted
the FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television. Arguably, that was the case in Permian.
See Kitch, supra note 455, at 243-44, 254-57.
458. 392 U.S. at 178.
459. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Southwestern's sanction of actions protective of broadcasting"); Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 296 (1972) (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting).
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the Supreme Court in Southwestern as 'ancillary to broadcast-
ing' [sic] does not cease at the point cable becomes involved in
intrastate point-to-point non-video communications. '"4 0 The
FCC asserted substantial jurisdiction over nonbroadcast cable
programming, stating: "We believe that such regulation is prop-
erly the concern of this Commission. These [access] channels
fulfill Communications Act purposes and, in the context of our
total program, are integrally bound up with the broadcast sig-
nals being carried by cable.
'461
In other words, if the FCC interpreted "reasonably ancil-
lary" narrowly, it could regulate cable television only to protect
broadcasters and not to permit cable's development as a com-
peting medium. Commissioner Lee, dissenting from the 1972
Cable Television Order, accused the FCC of following the
broader interpretation of "reasonably ancillary." This course, in
his opinion, changed the issue from preventing the "impairment
of broadcast service" to considering "what must cable be given
in the way of opportunities to use broadcast signals in order to
grow and prosper . .. - Given that a major issue in cable tel-
evision regulation was whether cable should become an indepen-
dent competing medium or regulated to protect existing broad-
casters,463 the protective interpretation of "reasonably ancillary"
amounts to a significant policy decision on an important issue.
Although the Supreme Court must place limits on the FCC's ju-
risdiction, it seems inappropriate for the Court's limiting institu-
tional considerations to decide a major policy question. Addi-
tionally, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court should
decide issues as whether cable television should be permitted to
compete with broadcasting.
Nevertheless, the "reasonably ancillary" standard limits
FCC jurisdiction to some extent and may even protect cable tel-
460. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations Relative to the Advisability of Federal Pre-emption of Cable Tel-
evision Technical Standards. . ., 49 F.C.C.2d 1078, 1082 (1974). The policy announced
in this order was later overturned in National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
461. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972). In FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp. (II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the FCC
could not require cable television companies to provide access channels.
462. 36 F.C.C.2d at 296 (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting).
463. See Walsh, supra note 424, at 228-29.
[Vol. 35
84
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss2/2
LIMITS ON JUDICIAL CREATIVITY
evision from undue regulation.464 In Home Box Office V. FCC,465
for example, the court of appeals struck down the FCC's at-
tempt to restrict cable's presentation of feature films and sports
programming for a charge above the basic service fee. The court
held that the FCC could not, under the "reasonably ancillary"
standard, regulate cable to achieve objectives that the FCC
could not legitimately seek in regulating the broadcast me-
dium.6 6 Similarly, when the FCC ordered cable television sys-
tems to make certain channels available to third parties, the Su-
preme Court overturned the requirement in FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp. (11).47 The Court, using the "reasonably ancillary"
standard,468 concluded that section 3(h) of the Communications
Act,469 which prohibits the Commission from imposing common-
carrier obligations on broadcasters, 470 also bars the imposition of
such obligations on cable television systems.47 1 However, one
commentator has criticized these decisions, arguing that
"[n]either the Supreme Court, nor the various courts of appeals,
should interfere with the experimental process dictated by the
complexities of regulation in an imperfect world except on the
clearest of evidence. '472 While such criticism may have merit in
considering how to develop cable television regulation policy,47 3
these judicial limitations of FCC jurisdiction appear appropriate
given the FCC's tenuous jurisdictional basis over cable.474
464. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-34 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
465. 567 F.2d at 28-34.
466. Id. at 34.
467. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
468. Id. at 691, 708.
469. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
470. 440 U.S. at 705.
471. Id. at 706-09. While the "reasonably ancillary" standard tends to limit FCC
jurisdiction over cable television to that of protecting broadcasters, the cases defining
"reasonably ancillary" have imposed an additional limitation: the FCC cannot regulate
cable in a manner inconsistent with its regulation of television broadcasters.
472. Shoenberger, supra note 424, at 151. Shoenberger's entire article is devoted to
a criticism of Home Box Office and Midwest II. Although this quotation is a fair general-
ization of Shoenberger's view, one must consult the entire article for the full reasoning
behind his conclusion.
473. See Shoenberger, supra note 424, at 137. See also Barnett, supra note 418, at
734.
474. See Berman, supra note 417, at 185. Berman asserts that:
[T]he application of that 40-year-old Act to cable television has been marked
by Commission vacillation and self-reversal, both with respect to its own juris-
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A limiting construction of "reasonably ancillary" tends to
focus FCC authority on the protection of broadcasting, not the
development of cable. On the other hand, if the FCC possesses
broad authority to regulate cable television in the public inter-
est, the FCC might impose undue requirements on cable televi-
sion. In the absence of congressional input, the FCC arguably
should impose only those regulations necessary to implement ex-
pressed congressional directives. Thus, the "reasonably ancil-
lary" standard also protects the cable industry against regula-
tion in the absence of a congressional consensus. Thus limited,
the "reasonably ancillary" standard may frustrate the imple-
mentation of the best cable television regulatory policy, yet
these limits are probably appropriate given.the judicial source of
FCC jurisdiction over cable television.
Another problem, the copyright issue, further complicated
the Supreme Court's task in Southwestern Cable. The copyright
issue involved the nature of a cable television company's opera-
tion; that is, a cable television company is, in effect, selling an-
other party's copyrighted programming material. Nevertheless,
one week after deciding Southwestern Cable, the Supreme
Court, in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,475
held that cable systems do not violate federal law when they
present material under copyright. In Fortnightly, the Supreme
Court conceded that the applicable statute provided no congres-
sional guidance on the issue.47 However, unlike Southwestern
Cable, which held cable television subject to FCC jurisdiction
despite the absence of congressional guidance, the Court in Fort-
nightly found the copyright statute inapplicable. 7 This deci-
sion left the FCC free to develop rules to protect the interested
diction and its own substantive rules. There is no legislative history to aid the
Commission in the regulation of cable television. There are no true standards
or specific procedures to guide the Commission in its application of its self-
assumed, broad delegation of power over cable television. The need for con-
gressional action is apparent and, with regard to cable television regulation,
such action is long overdue.
Id.
475. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
476. Id. at 395. Justice Stewart's majority opinion stated: "But our inquiry cannot
be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was
drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal
here." Id. (footnote omitted).
477. Id. at 400-02.
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parties in the absence of copyright liability.' 8
In Fortnightly, the Court analyzed the issue by comparing
broadcasters to performers. The Court found broadcasters liable
under the Copyright Act, but concluded that cable viewers are
simply receivers similar to a theater audience.19 Under this
analogy, cable television systems are mere viewer-helpers and
are not considered to be performers subject to copyright liabil-
ity.4 0 Despite subsequent changes in the character of cable tele-
vision systems, including the importation of distant signals and
the origination of cable television's own programming, the Su-
preme Court in 1974 adhered to its prior determination that
cable television systems were mere viewer-helpers not subject to
copyright liability.48 ' In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Su-
preme Court emphasized that the problems presented by "shifts
in current business and commercial relationships. . . cannot be
controlled by means of litigation based on copyright legislation
enacted more than a half a century ago, when neither broadcast
television nor CATV was yet conceived.' 4 2 In suggesting that
regulation of these relationships should be left to Congress,
4 3
the Court acknowledged that Congress had made little legisla-
tive progress since Fortnightly.
4' 8
The legal status of cable television following Southwestern
Cable and Fortnightly was uncertain. While the Communica-
tions Act did not contain specific provisions governing cable tel-
evision, the FCC through Southwestern Cable had obtained ju-
risdiction to regulate cable television. The "reasonably ancillary"
standard, however, substantially circumscribed the FCC's au-
thority to regulate cable television and generally frustrated the
478. See Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1143 (1982). See also R.O. BERNER, CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATORY
PROcEss: A CASE STUDY OF CABLE TELEVISION 24-32 (1976).
479. 392 U.S. at 398-99.
480. Id. at 399-402.
481. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974). In
Teleprompter, the Court held that a television broadcast makes a program public. Ac-
cordingly, the cable television company simply provides its subscribers with the means to
receive the program. Id. at 408. As defined by the FCC, distant signals are those televi-
sion signals which originate outside of the viewing area of the cable system's customers.
See also Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Marketplace
Model, 2 COMM/ENT L.J. 477, 479-80 (1980).
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FCC's intent to regulate cable for development in the public in-
terest. Instead, this standard permitted the FCC to regulate
cable television in a manner similar to the FCC's jurisdiction
over broadcasting. Thus, the "reasonably ancillary" standard
clearly permitted regulations to protect broadcasting,48 5 but ex-
cluded wider ranging regulations related to the broader use of
cable in the public interest. Although in some ways the "reason-
ably ancillary" standard protected cable from undue regulation,
that standard also seemed designed to require the FCC to use its
jurisdiction to protect the existing broadcasting industry.
On the other hand, holding cable television not subject to
copyright liability provided a needed boost to the fledgling in-
dustry. Because cable television would have experienced signifi-
cant difficulty in obtaining permission to use copyrighted mate-
rial, especially when broadcasters held the copyrights, it is
questionable whether cable could have survived subject to full
copyright liability.486 Further, it is uncertain whether a Fort-
nightly holding imposing copyright liability on cable television
would have resulted in congressional relief. In any event, with
485. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (I), 406 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1972) (plu-
rality opinion of Justice Brennan). Nevertheless, until 1972 the FCC, "[i]nstead of trying
to equalize the competitive opportunities between CATV and its competitors... con-
sistently tried to restrict CATV's development." Barrow, supra note 421, at 693. See also
Cable Television Regulation Oversight, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
157-58 (1976)(Statement of Robert L. Schmidt, President, National Cable Television
Association).
486. See COPYRIGHT LAW R .VlSIN, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89
(1976); Besen, Manning and Mitchell, Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compul-
sory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67, 86 (1978). In reporting the
bill for the 1976 revised Copyright Act, the House Judiciary Committee said: "The Com-
mittee recognizes, however, that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to re-
quire every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was re-
transmitted by a cable system." H. REP. No. 1476, supra, at 484. One writer, who
reported on the FCC's experiment requiring cable television systems to obtain the
originating stations' consent in order to deliver distant signals to the cable system's cus-
tomers, stated that the originating stations refused to give their consent. Walsh, supra
note 424, at 221. Walsh also stated that "requiring the CATV system to obtain consent
from each copyright holder would impose an impossible administrative burden." Id.
When the Senate considered a cable bill, Senator Pastore was asked whether the bill
contained a provision that would require a cable television company to obtain the con-
sent of broadcasters before distributing signals. Senator Pastore replied: "I will say to
the Senator, that even I would not vote for passage of the bill if that were required,
because I think that would be an invitation to destroy the CATV industry. I am not bent
on destroying the industry." 106 CONG. REC. 10,424 (1960).
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cable held exempt from copyright liability, some impetus for
congressional action remained. Broadcasters and copyright hold-
ers constituted a formidable group with substantial lobbying
power, and the Court left them armed with a powerful argu-
ment: cable stations were selling a valuable product which they
obtained without cost.
48 7
Although the Court's holdings may not have furthered the
best possible regulation of cable television, these holdings argua-
bly left the interested parties well-positioned to seek a legisla-
tive solution. Cable escaped the potentially devastating effects of
the Copyright Act, but the FCC remained in a position to pro-
tect existing broadcasting markets by limiting imported distant
signals. Also, the Court's grant of power to the FCC, while un-
clear, prevented chaos in the broadcasting industry and left
Congress free to act.
Unfortunately, the root of the problem was Congress' failure
to enact cable television legislation during the early stages of
that industry. This was probably because each of the three con-
tending industries-the copyright holders, the cable television
systems, and the broadcasters-had the ability to block any dis-
agreeable legislative solution.488 Further, injecting the cable tele-
vision issue into the process of revising the Copyright Act
delayed action on the matter for a substantial period because of
the problems involved in reaching an agreement regarding
cable.
489
By 1968 the FCC had determined that cable television, op-
erating with distant signals, could achieve significant penetra-
tion in the major television markets.490 But obtaining permission
487. One writer referred to this argument as "the 'pirate' stigma which had blem-
ished cable's image among legislators and rulemakers." Popham, supra note 424, at 825
(footnote omitted).
488. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 290 (1972)(Burch,
Ch., concurring). In 1976, Dean Burch, then a former FCC Chairman, made the following
statement to a congressional subcommittee conducting hearings on cable television pol-
icy that "Congress is normally in synch with or even slightly ahead of public opinion,
but, in arcane fields like telecommunications, a public opinion consensus is normally
lacking and the myriad duties of the Congress make it a difficult arena to thrash out the
unique problems faced daily by the FCC." Hearings, supra note 485, at 4.
489. Hearings, supra note 485, at 7 (testimony of Dean Burch); Letter from Senator
John L. McClellan to Hon. Dean Burch, January 31, 1972, set forth in Appendix E,
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 287 (1972).
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to carry distant signals was difficult,49' prompting the FCC in
1972 to begin efforts "to get cable moving.""92 Despite political
complications, the broadcast industry, the cable industry, and
the program production industry reached a consensus agree-
ment4 13 in late 1972, clearing the way for the adoption of rules
regulating cable television.9"
In order to permit cable systems to operate on a viable basis
while protecting existing broadcast service, the FCC rules lim-
ited to two, for the most part, the number of distant signals
cable systems could import into the major markets. 95 Prior to
adopting these rules, the FCC transmitted its cable policy to the
appropriate congressional committee9 8 through a "Letter of In-
tent. 4 97 Shortly thereafter, Dean Burch, the FCC Chairman,
and Dr. Clay Whitehead, head of the President's Office of Tele-
communications Policy (OTP), conducted a series of negotia-
tions between representatives of the broadcasters, the copyright
holders (program-production industry), and the cable television
interests. 498 The consensus agreement developed during those
negotiations was then incorporated into the FCC's rules.
499
Perhaps the consensus agreement's most important contri-
bution to the FCC rules was the exclusivity protection extended
to syndicated programming. 500 One writer concluded that the ex-
491. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 165 (1972).
492. Id. at 164.
493. Appendix D, id. at 284-86. For an extensive discussion of the consensus agree-
ment, see R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 39-60; Popham, supra note 424, passim. The
Commission's discussion of the agreement is set forth in the Cable Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d at 165.
494. See Appendix E, Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 212-60.
495. See Cable Television Service Rules, §§ 76.61, 76.63, 36 F.C.C.2d at 231-33. The
FCC originally proposed a limit of four. Id. at 169. See also id. at 264 (Appendix C); R.O.
BERNER, supra note 478, at 31.
496. Set forth in Appendix C to the Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d
at 260-79.
497. For a discussion of the context in which the letter was adopted and sent to the
chairmen of the Senate and House subcommittees on communications, see R.O. BERNER,
supra note 478, at 28-32, 34.
498. See 36 F.C.C.2d at 291 (Burch, Ch., concurring); id. at 310-11 (Johnson,
Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part); R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 46-
47.
499. 36 F.C.C.2d at 165-68; R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 56.
500. See, e.g., Appendix A, History of Signal Carriage Regulation, Cable Television
Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d
652, 823 (1980), petition to set aside denied, Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140
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clusivity protection seemed "designed to protect the economic
interest of broadcasters who wish to minimize competition from
cable." 50 1 Still, the consensus agreement did produce some bene-
fits for cable, such as the distant signal importation allowance. 2
Also, all the parties agreed to support copyright legislation
designed to provide for compulsory licensing of cable systems to
broadcast FCC authorized programs.0 3
Thus, the broadcasters accepted rules permitting some cable
television growth, and the cable interests accepted the concept
of copyright liability. While admitting that the rules, as modified
by the consensus agreement, permitted cable to make a "very
modest start in some of the smallest markets," Commissioner
Johnson charged that the compromise and the rules were a
"patchwork of protectionism, designed to foster the interests of
vested economic institutions at the expense of the public."50
Chairman Burch defended the final agreement as "reasonable,
fair and consistent with the public interest."505
The substantive merits of the 1972 cable rules and consen-
sus agreement are not of major concern in this Article. Rather,
the agreement was necessary before the FCC could adopt the
rules, thus illustrating the extremely complex political situation
that the Supreme Court left to the FCC. After examining the
process leading to FCC adoption of the 1972 cable television
rules, one commentator concluded: "Although the overtness of
the consensus agreement may have been unique, the history of
cable regulation suggests that the dynamics of this agreement
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d at 166; R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 51-53. The agreement also modified the
standard used for determining which out-of-market stations cable would not be required
to carry and changed the restrictions on importing distant signals ("leapfrogging"). See
36 F.C.C.2d at 312 (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting); R.O. BERNER, supra
note 478, at 40.
501. R.O. BERNER, supra note 478 at 51. See also id. at 52-53. Berner called exclu-
sivity protection the method of protecting the program production industry that "hap-
pens also to be a most effective means of hindering cable growth." Id. at 51. Commis-
sioner Johnson, in his dissenting and concurring opinion attacking the agreement,
charged that exclusivity protection would render "virtually all attractive programming
... unavailable to cable systems during terms of contracts that theoretically can exist
forever." 36 F.C.C.2d at 313.
502. See Popham, supra note 424, at 828.
503. 36 F.C.C.2d at 285.
504. Id. at 311 (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
505. Id. at 291 (Burch, Ch., concurring).
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accurately portray forces that have been present throughout
cable's regulatory history as more or less active constraints on
the FCC's policy choices."50
While Commissioner Johnson criticized the adoption of the
consensus agreement into the the rules as "a threat to the demo-
cratic system of government, '507 the adoption represents a bal-
ancing of political interests, rather than agency policy plan-
ning.0 8 However, because the industry groups heavily influenced
the decisionmakers in this case, Commissioner Johnson sug-
gested that the FCC had substituted the industry interest for
the public interest. 09 Yet, one could argue, as did the FCC
Chairman, 10 that such an agreement, by permitting cable a
modest start, actually furthered the public interest.
The intensity of the interests and the nature of the conflict
between the industries necessitated an extraordinary proce-
dure.5 11 Ordinarily, when administrative agencies resolve group
506. R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 56.
507. 36 F.C.C.2d at 314 (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
508. See R.O. BERNER, supra note 478, at 55.
509. 36 F.C.C.2d at 314-15 (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
510. The Chairman stated that he joined the "effort to secure a consensus among
the industries that would lead to resolution of the cable/copyright issue, de-escalate the
level of violence, and thus greatly serve the public interest." Id. at 291 (Burch, Ch.,
concurring).
511. See supra text accompanying notes 493-94. The fact that the Consensus Agree-
ment was essential and that the court of appeals found it necessary to condemn ex parte
contacts in certain cable television rulemaking proceedings is indicative of the extreme
nature of the political controversy surrounding the cable television industry at the time.
See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In Home Box Office, the court was "particularly concerned
that the final shaping of the [pay cable] rules ... may have been by compromise among
the contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the independent discretion in
the public interest the Communications Act vests in individual commissioners." 567 F.2d
at 53 (citation omitted). The intense pressure was evident when a bill to grant the FCC
jurisdiction over cable television reached the Senate floor in 1960. One Senator re-
marked, "I have the feeling that not only are we being watched, but we are surrounded,
and I think that fact ought to be called to the attention of this body." 106 CONG. REc.
10,418 (1960)(remarks of Senator McGee). Senator Pastore, managing the bill, told the
Senate:
This has been a blitz campaign. I ask Senators who perhaps are not too famil-
iar with the bill. [sic] How many of them were approached by these CATV
people months and months ago .... But now, at the 11th hour, when the bill
has been called up for action on the floor of the Senate, we are subjected to a
blitz in the form of telegrams and of personal appearances in an attempt to
make Senators believe that the bill will destroy-yes, destroy-their business.
That is not true.
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interests, they do so only after Congress has resolved some dis-
putes and has given the agency general guidance or direction.
Even when the applicable statute cannot provide guidance, the
legislative history or the statutory purpose and context will
often give some direction. Thus, the central question in the
cable situation is whether a seven-person agency with members
of limited terms should give the imprimatur of law to a compro-
mise reached by competing industries.
Several subsequent developments are noteworthy. Although
preceded by some delay,512 in 1976 Congress enacted provisions
for compulsory licensing of cable television, including payment
of copyright fees.5 13 In 1980 the FCC eliminated distant signal
carriage limitations on cable television systems,514 resulting in
substantial deregulation.1 5 In Malrite T.V. of New York v.
106 CONG. REC. 10,421 (1960). The bill was recommitted by a vote of 39 to 38. 106 CONG.
REc. 10,547 (1960).
512. See Popham, supra note 424, at 813.
513. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). At the same time, Congress created a
Copyright Royalty Tribunal with authority to adjust cable copyright royalty rates. 17
U.S.C. § 801(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. III
1979). See generally Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles the
CATV-Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y. L. ScH.L. REv. 545 (1977).
514. See Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1143 (1982). See also Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Re-
port, 71 F.C.C.2d 951 (1979); Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004 (1979). For a discussion of deregula-
tion, see Besen and Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 4 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 77, 103-17, 122-24 (1981).
515. In denying the petition to set aside the FCC's action, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals stated: "In a major reversal of its regulatory policy, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ... has decided to deregulate cable television by rescinding rules re-
lating to syndicated program exclusivity and distant signal carriage." Malrite T.V. of
N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). See also
FCC Now All But Out of the Cable Business, BROADCASTING, July 28, 1980, at 25-27.
Although the FCC has now lifted the major regulatory obstacles to cable television's
development, thus justifying the courts' use of the word "deregulation," cable television
still remains subject to a number of FCC imposed rules and regulations. See Cable Tele-
vision Service Rules and Regulations, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-76.617 (1982) as amended,
Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Authorize the Transmission of Teletext by
TV Stations, (FCC Docket No. 81-74) 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054 (June 13, 1983). (The June 13,
1983 amendment, adopted as part of the decision authorizing television broadcasters to
provide teletext service, provides that cable systems need not carry the teletext service of
television broadcasters even though they must carry the other broadcast signals of those
stations. 48 Fed. Reg. at 27,065-66, 27,069 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.64). Cable
systems are still subject, for example, to rules requiring the carriage of certain broadcast
signals, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61 (1982), and prohibiting the carriage of certain
live sports events, 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (1982), and programming that duplicates certain
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FCC,516 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's
repeal of the distant signal carriage limitations and syndicated
programming exclusivity rules noting the "widespread participa-
tion of all industry segments and comprehensive evaluation of
technical data." 51 The court found that the FCC's action re-
flected "the 'rational weighing of competing policies' Congress
intended to be exercised by the agency and to be sustained by a
reviewing court."518 The court then supported that statement
with the following footnote: "As one commentator has noted, the
more the question of agency choice comes to resemble a political
process, weighing claims of competing interest groups, the less
the apparent justification for judicial supervision of Congress's
[sic] delegation of choice to the agency." 519 Whatever the valid-
ity of the interest representation model 520 in evaluating adminis-
trative agency action in situations in which Congress has pro-
vided no guidance, courts should not justify agency action on the
grounds that Congress, through silence, has delegated such
power to the agency.
Congress still has not enacted a statute governing cable tele-
vision regulation, but a bill that would define the FCC's cable
television jurisdiction and establish a national cable television
policy passed the Senate in June 1983 and awaits House ac-
tion.52 1 In addition, the FCC's repeal of the distant signal limita-
programming of local stations. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-76.99 (1982).
516. 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
517. 652 F.2d at 1152.
518. Id. (citing FCC v. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803
(1978)).
519. 652 F.2d at 1152 n.17 (citing Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1787 (1975).
520. See supra text accompanying notes 407-14.
521. The Senate passed S. 66 on June 14, 1983. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CONG. REc.
S8324-28 (daily edition, June 14, 1983). The statement of purpose in section 602 of that
bill reads as follows:
Sec. 602. The purposes of this title are to-
(1) establish a national policy concerning broadband telecommunications
and to encourage a competitive environment for the growth and development
of broadband telecommunications;
(2) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local regula-
tory authority;
(3) allow cable systems to be responsive to the needs and interests of the
public on an equal basis without a competitive disadvantage with other provid-
ers of telecommunications services; and
(4) eliminate government regulation in order to prevent the imposition of
[Vol. 35
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tion sparked renewed turmoil over the compulsory license and
resulted in activity which sought new legislation522 and an in-
creased fee structure.2 s
While the lack of legislative guidance left the FCC operating
in a highly volatile political environment, the absence of such
guidance also left undetermined the scope of FCC jurisdiction.
The FCC's attempt to require cable television systems to initiate
programming524 illustrates that difficulty. In United States v.
an unnecessary economic burden on cable systems in their provision of service
to the public.
Id. at S8325. The House has now begun consideration of cable television legislation. See
House's Turn on Cable Dereg., BROADCASTING, June 27, 1983, at 81-82; House Takes Up
Cable Debate, BROADCASTING, May 30, 1983, at 51-53.
522. See generally In Brief, BROADCASTING, August 23, 1982, at 80, second item:
'Blown apart,' are words used by parties to cable copyright compromise to describe
latest development in complicated negotiations that began more than 11 months ago";
Copyright: the Nit and Grit of H.R. 5949, BROADCASTING, April 5, 1982, at 132-34; Cable
Copyright Gets Full Committee Approval, id. at 39-40; Common Carrier Amendment
Delays Copyright Bill, BROADCASTING, March 29, 1982, at 36-38. Although the 97th Con-
grass took no action, the 98th Congress introduced legislation dealing with the cable tele-
vision copyright issue. H.R. 1388, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. H511 (daily edi-
tion, February 10, 1983). H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H8193 (daily
edition, October 6, 1983). See Wheeler Lashes Out at H.R. 4103 Foes, BROADCASTING,
December 19, 1983, at 36; Cites Pull Back Support for H.R. 4103, BROADCASTING, De-
cember 5, 1983, at 39-40; Wirth's Cable Bill Comes Under Fire, BROADCASTING, Novem-
ber 7, 1983, at 37-38.
523. See CRT Hears Final Words on Distant Signal Royalties, BROADCASTING, Sep-
tember 13, 1982, at 66-68; In Brief, BROADCASTING, September 6, 1982, at 81, second full
item: "National Association of Broadcasters filed findings of fact with Copyright Royalty
Tribunal last week which it says backs up its claim that royalty rates paid by cable
television systems for carriage of new distant signals should be raised by significant
amount." The Copyright Royalty Tribunal did raise copyright fees for distant signals
provoking opposition from the National Cable Television Association, which appealed
the ruling. See NCTA Files Appeal of CRT Rate Hike, BROADCASTING, January 31, 1983,
at 64-65; Feeling the Weight of the CRT Signal Fee Increases, BROADCASTING, January
10, 1983, at 31-32; Where Things Stand, Cable Copyright and CRT, BROADCASTING, Jan-
uary 3, 1983, at 20; Turner Wins Bid to Delay CRT Hike, BROADCASTING, January 3,
1983, at 31-32; NCTA Petitions Appeals Court to Delay CRT Rate Hike, BROADCASTING,
November 29, 1982, at 34; Cable Industry Mounting Counterattack on CRT, BROAD-
CASTING, November 22, 1982, at 24-25. Early in 1984, as this Article went to press, the
court of appeals affirmed the CRT's action. National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
524. See First Report and Order in Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201 (1969), set
aside sub nom., Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972). After the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to re-
quire cable systems to originate programming, the FCC abandoned the requirement. Re-
port and Order in Docket No. 19988, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
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Midwest Video Corp. (J), 525 the Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's authority to impose this requirement, but the Court was
unable to produce a majority opinion. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Brennan, joined by three other members of the Court,
acknowledged that the Communications Act did not "prescribe
any objectives for which the Commission's regulatory power over
CATV might properly be exercised. ' 521 Midwest Video chal-
lenged the FCC's authority to condition a cable television sys-
tem's carriage of broadcast signals on the requirement that the
system also originate programming.52 7 The plurality asserted
that the authority granted the FCC in Southwestern Cable
52
8
empowered the FCC to promulgate regulations designed to fur-
ther the general policies of the Communications Act.5 29 Although
program origination does not necessitate the use of the broad-
cast spectrum, the plurality concluded that the requirement was
nonetheless "reasonably ancillary" to the regulation of broad-
casting because, while receiving cable broadcast signals, viewers
would be provided "suitably diversified programming.
53 °
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion stressed the difference
between program origination and the functions performed by
the cable systems in Southwestern Cable. In Douglas' view, pro-
gram origination would require new or different investment,
equipment, and personnel.53 1 Justice Douglas argued that
"bludgeon[ing]" a cable system into becoming a broadcaster
should only be done by statutory amendment. 2  His opening
paragraph summarized his view:
The policies reflected in the plurality opinion may be wise
ones. But whether CATV systems should be required to origi-
nate programs is a decision that we certainly are not compe-
tent to make and in my judgment the Commission is not au-
thorized to make. Congress is the agency to make the decision
525. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
526. Id. at 661.
527. 20 F.C.C.2d at 208-09.
528. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See supra notes
439-58 and accompanying text.
529. 406 U.S. at 664.
530. Id. at 669.
531. Id. at 677-78.
532. Id. at 680-81.
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and Congress has not acted. 3
Chief Justice Burger cast the deciding vote upholding the
FCC's authority to require program origination. According to
Burger, the fact that cable systems use broadcast programming
for profit was enough to justify the imposition of FCC jurisdic-
tion, even though this jurisdiction might impose a burden. 34 De-
spite his conclusion, Burger acknowledged that "the Commis-
sion's position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended
and pervasive jurisdiction" of the FCC over cable television.5 35
The Chief Justice also distinguished his opinion from the dis-
sent's. While Douglas found that congressional inaction pre-
cluded imposition of the program origination requirement, Bur-
ger concluded that in the absence of congressional action, the
Court must follow the FCC's lead. He concluded his opinion by
stating:
Congress has created its instrumentality to regulate broadcast-
ing, has given it pervasive powers, and the Commission has
generations of experience and "feel" for the problem. I there-
fore conclude that until Congress acts, the Commission should
be allowed wide latitude and I therefore concur in the result
reached by this Court.
5 36
The Chief Justice called upon Congress to reexamine the Com-
munications Act in light of cable television's development "so
that basic policies are considered by Congress and not left en-
tirely to the Commission and the courts.
5 3 7
In summary, no judicial consensus exists on the meaning of
the phrase, "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting. '538 The Supreme Court used the phrase
in Southwestern Cable to limit the FCC's jurisdiction over cable
television. On the other hand, a plurality of the Court used the
phrase in Midwest Video (I), again in the context of a limitation
on FCC jurisdiction, to grant the FCC broad jurisdiction to en-
533. Id. at 677.




538. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
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sure the full public benefit of television (video) service. 39 "Rea-
sonably ancillary" could also mean that FCC jurisdiction is lim-
ited to protecting over-the-air television broadcasting.5 41 Justice
Douglas tried to limit FCC jurisdiction by extracting from the
Communications Act a prohibition against forcing a company
into a particular business. 4' Chief Justice Burger did not even
attempt to articulate the limits of "reasonably ancillary," but
simply stated that the FCC had reached, but did not exceed, the
limits of its jurisdiction.542
Without guidance from the Communications Act, the Court
has little reasoned basis for choosing one limit over another.
Perhaps this is what the Chief Justice was suggesting when he
used the word "candor" in his opinion. 43 In any event, those
who prefer decisions that produce rational and consistent policy-
making will favor a decision that grants the FCC broad jurisdic-
tion. As Justice Brennan, speaking for the plurality, explained:
[T]o define the Commission's power in terms of the protection,
as opposed to the advancement, of broadcasting objectives
would artificially constrict the Commission in the achievement
of its statutory purposes and be inconsistent with our recogni-
tion in Southwestern "that it was precisely because Congress
wished 'to maintain, through appropriate administrative con-
trol, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,'...
that it conferred upon the Commission a 'unified jurisdiction'
and 'broad authority.' "4
While that approach makes sense from a reasoned decisionmak-
ing perspective, such an approach is troublesome because it con-
fers extremely broad authority on the FCC without any reasoned
basis for judicial evaluation.5 45 Midwest Video (I) illustrates that
539. 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972).
540. See id. at 665-66 (plurality opinion).
541. Id. at 679-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
542. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
543. Id.
544. Id. at 665 (footnote omitted).
545. See, e.g., Recent Development, 4 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 391, 399 (1973). See also
supra notes 464-69 and accompanying text. In National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 611-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court held that the FCC did
not have jurisdiction to regulate the use of cable system leased access channels for two-
way, point-to.point, nonvideo communications. Judge Wright, however, vigorously dis-
puted that position. Id. at 628-33 (Wright, J., dissenting). The jurisdictional standard
established by the Supreme Court does not appear to furnish the court of appeals with a
[Vol. 35
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reasoned judicial decisionmaking requires minimal legislative
guidance, at least in regulatory areas. In the absence of this
guidance, the reasoning process lacks any commonly held value
and requires the court to use as a basis for future decisions its
view of the best policy. While such judicial lawmaking may be
appropriate in the gradual incremental development of private
law, its propriety in delimiting comprehensive regulatory pro-
grams is questionable. Although court decisions prohibiting the
FCC from regulating cable systems differently than broadcast-
ers546 have established some limits on FCC action, those limita-
tions did not really originate within the "reasonably ancillary"
standard and, in any event, they do not indicate how the FCC
may regulate cable television.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The first part of this Article discussed the different view-
points prevalent in American jurisprudence regarding judicial
creativity in statutory application. The views range from abhor-
rence of an undemocratic body exercising power in a democratic
society to a celebration of judicial creativity as the epitome of
the craft of law creation. Even though this author favors rea-
soned decisionmaking and thus supports a substantial creative
role for the courts in statutory areas, this author questions the
ability of courts to handle unguided policymaking power in all
areas. Accordingly, the second part of this Article has examined
cable television regulation as an example of judicial creativity
that should be questioned, even by those who advocate the use
of creative judicial power. The Supreme Court's decision grant-
ing the FCC power to regulate cable television should be viewed
as illustrative of a category for analysis: decisions granting au-
thority to administrative agencies in the absence of a legislative
mandate.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to decide whether the
Court's grant of authority to the FCC produced good or bad pol-
reasoned basis for deciding this case. The case illustrates just how broadly the FCC could
define its jurisdiction and still make a credible jurisdictional argument.
546. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
See also supra notes 470-77 and accompanying text.
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icy. The abundance of legal literature on the subject 547 fails to
reveal a consensus one way or the other. One author, after criti-
cizing judicial limitation of the FCC's discretion to regulate
cable television,548 concluded:
Examination of the FCC's attempt to preside over the bur-
geoning cable television industry indicates a serious attempt to
deal with very complicated issues. The FCC's main concern has
been that cable not seriously harm the broadcast industry.
With this in mind, it has attempted to control the direction
and pace of development of cable television. Its reversals of
policy in some cases are indications that errors appear to have
been made. But they are also indications of an agency trying to
do its job. It is important that the courts realize this situation,
and interfere as little as possible.
54 9
On the other hand, two other authors write:
Virtually all of the premises upon which the Commission regu-
lated cable television have been shown to be invalid. This is,
and was, no surprise to students of the industry who argued
that they were invalid from the outset. The rapid change of
direction by the Commission must be attributed, at least in
part, to the mounting evidence which demonstrates that the
Commission's fears of the effects of cable growth were
exaggerated.5 0
Nevertheless, the question of whether courts should grant
regulatory power to administrative agencies is within the scope
of this Article. The analysis contained here suggests that given
the serious questions of resolving competition between indus-
tries, courts should not, as a general rule, grant regulatory power
to administrative agencies. The judicial resolution of conflicts
between industry groups cannot be performed on a reasoned ba-
sis. Thus, the zones of free competition in society, and the pre-
547. See supra note 424.
548. Shoenberger, supra note 424, at 151.
549. Id. at 153.
550. Besen and Crandall, supra note 514, at 79. Actually, the FCC may preempt
state regulation in this area. See, e.g., Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979); Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 204-10 (1972); Le Duc, Control of Cable Television: The Senseless Assault
on States' Rights, supra note 424; Mahony, Cable Television's Jurisdictional Dispute,
supra note 424; Wallach, supra note 424. This ability to preempt state regulation only
intensifies the criticism of FCC cable policies.
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cise areas where public policy limits that free competition,
should be determined by the legislature, not the courts.
Courts should act by reasoned decisions rooted in agreed-
upon values. In many areas that goal may be impossible to
achieve, and courts must act despite the lack of value agree-
ment. But at some point a court, including the Supreme Court,
seriously diminishes its effectiveness by going beyond agreed so-
cietal values.5 51 While the protection of freedom of speech justi-
fies the Court's action despite some loss of credit, it is highly
doubtful that the protection of established industries from com-
petition based on new technology justifies a similar loss of
credit. Therefore, when judicial decisions granting power to ad-
ministrative agencies involve economic policy differences rather
than fundamental values, the judiciary is not the appropriate
branch to act. Instead, the legislature should decide whether an
industry, or a group of industries, should be regulated.
Yet, this position does not mean the Supreme Court erred
in interpreting the Communications Act to grant the FCC au-
thority to regulate cable television. Faced with congressional in-
action and the FCC's allegation that failure to regulate cable tel-
evision might damage the existing broadcasting structure to the
detriment of long-held policies grounded in the Communications
Act,552 the Supreme Court correctly decided to uphold FCC ju-
risdiction. Given the interest representation model of adminis-
trative agencies, the Court, in the absence of congressional ac-
tion, wisely created a legal basis for the problem's solution at the
agency level.
The strongest argument against the Court's decision rests
on the idea of a judicial remand to the legislature. Proponents of
this argument reason that if the FCC's allegations of damage to
the broadcasting industry's existing structure proved true, that
damage would have forced Congress to act. Thus, because con-
gressional action was considered unlikely, the Court's decision
granting the FCC authority to regulate cable television only de-
creased the congressional incentive to act. Nevertheless, this ar-
gument may fail because "a remand to Congress in a significant
number of situations may be tantamount to a guarantee of no
551. Admittedly, this is a unsatisfactorily vague statement, even in a pluralistic
society.
552. 392 U.S. at 173-77.
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regulation, for Congress may simply not act for a large number
of reasons.
'55 3
Unfortunately, FCC policymaking pursuant to judicially
prescribed limits is not likely to produce the best cable regula-
tion policy. This is because the Court's basis for FCC jurisdic-
tion was cable's threat to the broadcasting industry's existing
structure. Two analysts of cable policy have noted this problem:
"More importantly, paying virtually exclusive attention to
whether, and to what extent, broadcasters should be protected
had led the Commission and other policymakers to ignore fun-
damental issues concerning the appropriate structure of the
cable industry.
'554
Thus, this analysis leads to an apparently contradictory
conclusion. The Supreme Court correctly found that the FCC
possessed jurisdiction to regulate cable television, but
courts-including the United States Supreme Court-should
not, as a general rule, grant jurisdiction to administrative agen-
cies. More specifically, given the conflicting economic interests
involved, Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, should es-
tablish the FCC's jurisdiction for regulating cable television.
Nevertheless, persistent legislative inaction may force judicial
action and, when that happens, judicial action may be the wiser
course.
Given the example of cable television regulation, Congress
must act to resolve more of the political controversies that arise
in our society. If there is a culprit in this Article, it is Congress.
Congressional failure to act on the question of whether and to
what extent the FCC could regulate cable television contributed
significantly to the problems discussed here. It is fitting to con-
clude this Article with the words of Professor Willard Hurst:
The need to effect a proper balance between responsibili-
ties to make general policy, to respond by proper delegation to
needs for more particularized development of policy, and to ex-
ercise effective supervision of executive and administrative
agencies, has posed constant challenges to twentieth-century
553. Shoenberger, supra note 424, at 135. A system of checks and balances functions
negatively: one branch may easily stop action by another branch. Thus, the remand-to-
the-legislature concept suffers from the general difficulty any branch of government has
in compelling another to take affirmative action.
554. Besen and Crandall, supra note 514, at 107.
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legislators. The nature of the demands people have been mak-
ing on government since the turn of the century, and which
experience teaches they will continue to make, indicates that
the problems of relating general and particular policy are fixed
firmly in the structure of the legal and social order. These
problems will not go away. They present the principal chal-
lenge of the times to the conscience, skill, and experience of
legislative lawmakers.
555
555. J.W. HURST, DEALING wITH STATUTES 28-29.
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